The Foreign Service Journal, March 2014

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH 2014 57 Hope Meets Reality Talking to Strangers: The Struggle to Rebuild Iraq’s ForeignMinistry Ghassan Muhsin Hussein and David Dun- ford, Southwestern College Academic Press, 2013, $18.95, paperback, 212 pages. Reviewed by Jack R. Binns It is difficult to think of an event in the past 20 years that has been as thoroughly examined, probed and critiqued as the George W. Bush administration’s ill-conceived and poorly executed Iraq intervention, which took place 11 years ago this month. Yet there remain untilled fields that yield new perspectives and use- ful insights, and this book is one. As its title, Talking to Strangers: The Struggle to Rebuild Iraq’s Foreign Minis- try , indicates, the book’s subject matter has considerable intrinsic value. But because it combines the viewpoints of two experienced diplomats, an Iraqi and an American, it offers a unique, ground-level perspective on diplomacy. The task on which Iraqi Ambassador Ghassan Muhsin Hussein (no relation to SaddamHussein) and U.S. Ambassador David Dunford collaborated after the U.S. invasion was daunting but relatively straightforward, at least on paper: rebuild- ing the Iraqi Foreign Ministry. Working under the aegis of the U.S. Office of Recon- struction and Humanitarian Assistance, Hussein and Dunford were largely suc- cessful, at least initially. The reconstituted ministry quickly gained control of the country’s 31 embas- sies and overseas assets, purged Saddam Hussein’s remaining loyalists, re-estab- lished key bilateral relationships and regained international recognition. And it did all this despite dysfunctional bureau- cracy (think an amalgam of Franz Kafka and Joseph Heller), cultural ignorance and an escalating security threat. In his account, Amb. Hussein focuses on the internal challenges the Iraqis faced, not all of which were caused by the war. He helpfully explains how the ministry had operated before the U.S. invasion, laying out the central roles of the security apparatus and Ba’ath Party oversight. Amb. Dunford’s portions of the book recount his own daily bureaucratic, logis- tical and security struggles. An experi- enced Middle East hand, he was sensitive to the cross-cultural factors that colored dealings with Iraqis, but found the U.S. military/civilian cultural conflicts nearly impossible to overcome. In particular, he describes the first leader of the Office of Reconstruction and Iraqi Humanitarian Assistance, retired General Jay Garner, as well-meaning but lacking useful guidance. Apparently out of his depth, Garner lacked the authority to ensure adequate support and security for his mostly civilian staff. For that reason, most of the ORHA civilian component greeted Garner’s replacement in May 2003 by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer with great relief. Within weeks, however, those hopes were dashed. Bremer abolished ORHA, merging it with the newmultilateral Coali- tion Provisional Authority, and issued a draconian order expelling all senior mem- bers of the Ba’ath Party from positions BOOKS within the Iraqi government. Although exceptions could be made, they were very rare, so the effect of this dictum was to strip the Iraqi govern- ment of most of its experienced civil servants. Amb. Hussein, who had spurned enticements to join the party, retained his post, but many of his colleagues were removed even though they lacked any meaningful attach- ment to Saddam’s regime. Both authors agree that the de- Ba’athification order was a critical error. Coupled with general ignorance of the deep cultural differences between Iraqi and American societies, it instantly made the process of normalizing governmental functions far more difficult. Citing their early success at the foreign ministry, Hussein and Dunford make a persuasive case that the overall outcome in Iraq could have been far more positive and produc- tive had the removal of government offi- cials been more thoughtful and nuanced. I should note that the book is not an easy read, especially for those unfamiliar with U.S. governmental acronyms. The authors’ compilation of such terms is, unfortunately, incomplete, leaving the reader in a quandary more than once. Similarly, the cast of characters (often only identified by first names) is huge and, at times, overwhelming. Again, the table of dramatis personae is incomplete even though it runs to 150 people. On the whole, however, anyone interested in the continuing evolution of Iraq will find Talking to Strangers full of insights. The book is also a most valuable addition to the literature about working- level diplomacy and governance. Jack R. Binns, a retired Senior Foreign Service officer, spent his 25-year diplomatic career Hussein and Dunford’s fruitful collaboration gives the reader a unique, ground-level perspective on diplomacy.