The Foreign Service Journal, March 2015

26 MARCH 2015 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Iran watchers address misunderstandings and challenge the regime’s deliberate mischaracterizations of our policies. This was generally done on an interpersonal basis until 2013, when the department approved a long-standing request to create an official Farsi-language spokesperson position. That official, currently based in London, has authorization to engage, in close coordination withWashington, the Iranianmedia and to post in Farsi on social media. While Iran watchers are not directly involved in sensitive nuclear negotiations, they represent a critical feedback loop for policymakers. They informWashington of reactions, both by Irani- ans and others, to our public positions; and they track and assess the impact of Iran-focused sanctions imposed by the United States, European Union and United Nations. In an effort to expandmutual understanding, the department also tasked IRPO in 2006 to launch a reinvigoration of our official exchange programs with Iran, particularly the International Visi- tors Leadership Program. Iran reacted predictably, demonstrating its deeply ingrained paranoia that everything the United States does masks an intent of regime change. In 2008, it arrested several people connected with exchanges, despite the clear intent of the program to provide a platform for exchange of best practices in areas of mutual interest, such as health. Nonetheless, we have managed to continue some cultural exchange programs, to the benefit of both countries. Prior to the Iranian Revolution, Iran was one of the top-ranked countries of origin for foreign students in the United States. That number plummeted through the 1980s and 1990s; but after U.S. efforts to eliminate roadblocks, many of which were identified by Iran watchers, Iran now ranks 22nd among countries of origin for foreign students. In addition to setting up a Farsi-language online advising pro- gram, in 2011 the State Department unilaterally extended the valid- ity of student visas for Iranians from three months/one entry, to two years/multiple entry. This occurred after years of reporting by Iran watchers that the limited visa was actually eroding students’ ties with their home country, because students were afraid to go home over the course of their study and risk not getting another visa. Iran, of course, is not the only place where we do not have a diplomatic presence. The department has used a different diplo- matic model for North Korea, led by a special representative, and is adapting to new challenges like Syria and Libya. But the Iran Watcher program is a possible model for conducting remote diplo- macy, despite some drawbacks. A Viable Model, Despite Drawbacks One disadvantage is the lack of an ambassador-level voice from the field in policy deliberations inWashington. Second, the limited career options for Iran experts make it more difficult to institu- tionalize expertise. While it is possible to follow Iranian develop- ments from a variety of angles (see sidebar, p. 24), including at the National Security Council and on the seventh floor of State, the lack of an embassy and consulates diminishes somewhat the attractiveness of specializing in Iran issues. Moreover, serving as a watcher in non-Farsi language posts with only limited opportuni- ties to speak Farsi makes language retention difficult. Clearly, then, this kind of nontraditional diplomatic work requires case-specific adaptation and training. Toward that end, the Foreign Service Institute is beginning to study the logistics of conducting diplomacy in countries where we lack a presence, with the aimof teaching this tradecraft to our diplomats. Some of this training can also be useful for diplomats serving in countries where we maintain an embassy but have reducedmobil- ity because of security concerns. After the fact, I realized that I had applied lessons learned during my stint as an Iran watcher while serving in western Afghanistan from 2012 to 2013, as we sought to cope with a shrinking diplomatic presence in the country. Admit- tedly, it helped that we had a fairly systematic glide path of military base closures around which we could plan, rather than having to draw down rapidly in a crisis, with little warning, as is more often the case. When I joined the Foreign Service in 1993, the State Depart- ment had recently opened posts throughout the former Soviet Union, where we had never had a presence before—I didn’t know where half of the posts onmy first bid list were. Meanwhile, we were closing posts for budgetary reasons around the world. Our diplomatic map will continue to shift due to security and budgetary conditions, but we must always be prepared to cover areas where we have no direct access; the quality of U.S. policy decisions depends on it. The IranWatcher program can serve as both an organizational model for remote diplomacy and a bench- mark for success. n There are few U.S. diplomats left in the Foreign Service who have ever visited Iran, let alone served there.