The Foreign Service Journal, March 2015

30 MARCH 2015 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL October 1979 that it would be a good idea to pour gasoline on the glowing embers of Iranian politics by admitting the shah to the United States. And just as U.S. Chief of Mission Bruce Laingen had predicted three months earlier, the results were: (1) collapse of the relatively moderate provisional government of Iran; (2) end of any contact between the U.S. government and the new rulers of Iran; and, (3) end of the American diplomatic mission in Tehran. The Curse of Obliviousness Americans have nomonopoly on ignoring ghosts in the room. In early 2014, despite quiet warnings fromWashington, the Islamic Republic, under its new president, Hassan Rouhani, nominated Hamid Abutalebi to be its ambassador to the United Nations. It turned out that Abutalebi had been one of the “MoslemStudent Followers of the Imam’s Line” who had seized the U.S. embassy in November 1979 and, with the support of the Iranian authorities, held its staffmembers hostage for more than 14months. The appointment reopened a wound that had been festering for 35 years, provoking a firestorm of reaction in the United States that seemed to catch the Iranian side unaware. One can only ask: Were those who nominated Abutalebi aware of his past? If they were, why did they ignore the ghosts of that time and misread the damaging effects of their choice, even on those Americans who were willing to give Rouhani and his new team the benefit of the doubt? What were they thinking when they made such a nomina- tion? Were they thinking at all? Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s com- ments more than a year earlier provide some insight into how some Iranians deal—or do not deal—with the ghosts. At a private discussion with American academics in September 2012, during his visit to the United Nations General Assembly, Ahma- dinejad spoke about the need to end the “negative mentality” infecting the U.S.-Iranian relationship that frustrated all efforts at change. At the meeting I asked him: “Why not do as your predecessor (President Mohammad Khatami) did, and address the run- ning sore of the 1979 embassy seizure and hostage holding? For example, you could end or limit the annual demonstrations on Nov. 4, which pretend that ugly action was a positive thing. Such an act would be a powerful first step toward eliminating that negative mentality you have deplored.” Ahmadinejad appeared puzzled by the question. He seemed to be thinking: “Where did all that come from? What do those events of 33 years ago have to do with anything today?” His response, which completely missed the point, was: “Well, you were treated all right, weren’t you?” The problem is obliviousness. In this way of thinking, whatever happened then has nothing to do with today. The events of 1979 happened “a long time ago in a galaxy far away.”The far savvier Rouhani, Ahmadinejad’s successor, could be just as unaware of realities past and present and could nominate Abutalebi, a step which turned into a fiasco for the Iranians. Of course the Iranians are not the only oblivious ones. In 1973, President Richard Nixon also set a standard for thoughtlessness when he nominated the former CIA chief, Richard Helms, to be ambassador to Tehran. Did Nixon understand (or even care about) the symbolism of his action and the fact that this appoint- ment would be seen in Iran as a gratuitous humiliation?The mes- sage was: “You Iranians may think you’re a sovereign country. But I am sending you a reminder that you are not. Now I will show you who is really the boss.” The (Right) Road Back: Bring the Ghostbusters No enmity is forever. It took decades, but the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the USSR and China after their revo- lutions when it was in both sides’ interest to do so. Cuba is the latest case, although in Havana there has long been a large U.S. diplomatic presence in the form of an interests section. In the case of Iran, the reasons for the 35-year estrangement are some- times difficult to understand when balanced against the need to engage—not as friends, but as countries with matters to discuss— on subjects such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Sunni extremism. When we do send our people back, and when Iranian diplo- Top: Downtown Tehran at night. Middle: Tehran Imam Khomeini International Airport. Bottom: Valiasr Street, a main shopping area that separates Tehran’s eastern and western sectors. Courtesy of Mark Lijek