The Foreign Service Journal, March 2015

32 MARCH 2015 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL ing, both inside and outside the government. Beyond a posting in Iran, they should have related postings in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Caucasus and elsewhere. Their Washington assignments should also be relevant. There should be cross-training in other Middle Eastern cultures and in Arabic and the Turkic languages. Such a program is not for everyone. We are going to need serious and committed people, not just anyone who shows up or seeks to rescue a career. ■ Don’t do or say stupid stuff. We must be aware of the effects of our words and actions in an Iranian political culture that sees itself as the humiliated victim of powerful outsiders— British, Russian and American. We should avoid talking about “Iranian paranoia” or “Iranian DNA.” We will need lots of empa- thy to understand Iranian views of events and understand what lies behind sometimes extreme rhetoric. We should acknowl- edge the symbolic power of the ghosts of the Iran-Iraq War, the 1964 status of forces agreement controversy, the coup of 1953, the D’Arcy oil concession of 1901 and even the Turkmanchai Treaty of 1828, in which the Qajar rulers of Persia gave up their sovereignty to Czarist Russia. ■ Listen and be very patient . Since 1979, Iranian political discourse has too often consisted of reciting lists of complaints against the United States. Such recitation is both frustrating and unproductive. Yet a patient American listener needs to acknowl- edge, “Yes, I understand that you have grievances.” For a time, repeating these sterile lists can make dialogue very difficult. As long as we stay in the room and listen, however, sooner or later it will be possible to move into something more productive. That move happened with the nuclear negotiations in 2013. We waited out the rhetoric, remained professional and eventu- ally found ourselves in “productive” discussions with Iranian officials for the first time in 34 years. The change has not led to a quick resolution of problems, but on the symbolic level it has been an enormous shift frommore than three decades of trading insults, threats and slogans. Sooner or later, our Foreign Service colleagues will return to Tehran. They may even reoccupy the “[Loy] Henderson High” complex on Taleghani (formerly Takht-e-Jamshid) Avenue, although exorcising the ghosts that haunt those buildings may take even more time. When they do return, both sides should have learned their lessons: that a host government, even if it calls itself “revolution- ary,” is responsible for the safety and security of foreign diplo- mats; and that behind Iran’s positions and policies lies a real and imagined history of defeat, exploitation and humiliation. All candidates for an embassy post in Tehran should be asked: “What is the importance of Turkmanchai?” If they don’t know, they don’t go. n Top: A luxury shopping center at Sheikh Bahaei Square in the Vanak area of Tehran. Middle: One of the city’s many parks. Bottom: A panoramic view of Tehran in winter. Courtesy of Mark Lijek Former Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh (front right). The democratically elected prime minister was removed from power on Aug. 19, 1953, in a coup d’etat supported and funded by the British and U.S. governments. He was imprisoned for three years and then put under house arrest until his death in 1957. AFP/Getty Images