The Foreign Service Journal, March 2015

40 MARCH 2015 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL was rooted in his concern that after the U.S. withdrawal of its last troops from Vietnam the previous year, the Soviets might conclude that Washington would be less diligent in resisting the spread of communist influence in Africa, especially in the former Portuguese possessions. He chose Angola as the place to signal this was not the case, by furnishing arms to Bacongo tribal leader Holden Roberto and his followers. Helms and his allies were unable to block the opening of Embassy Maputo. But they were able to insert language into the State Department and USAID authorization bills proscribing the expenditure of any development aid money in Mozambique. (Ethiopia and Uganda were also singled out.) For its part, the Mozambique government instructed American personnel at our consulate in Maputo not to fly the American flag before my arrival. It also stipulated that when our embassy opened, there were to be no uniformed U.S. military personnel on the staff, precluding the use of Marine security guards. The Diplomatic Deep Freeze Gradually Thaws Fortunately, the Department of State assigned Johnnie Car- son, an exceptionally able officer, as my first deputy chief of mis- sion. The political officers who were assigned to Maputo were some of the best with whom I have ever served. All three DCMs during my five years as ambassador in Mozambique went on to serve as ambassadors elsewhere in Africa: Johnnie Carson, who retired as assistant secretary of State for African affairs, in Kenya; Roger McGuire in Guinea-Bissau; and Bill Twadell in Liberia and Nigeria. (Two of my three junior political officers also eventually became chiefs of mission: Jimmy Kolker in Burkina Faso and Uganda, and Howard Jeter in Nigeria). Those first 12 to 18 months at post were indeed frustrating. My staff of eight and I seemed to encounter obstacles what- ever we tried to do. Rarely did ministers or senior government officials accept invitations to embassy functions. To travel almost anywhere outside Maputo required Mozambican government approval, which was not always forthcoming and took time even when it was granted. Efforts to acquire rental property for our personnel proved difficult, as well. With the departure of the Portuguese, there was a lot of real estate on the market; but when we sought to sign our first lease, the government told us it was holding the property for one of their “natural allies,” who had expressed a “possible” interest in it. Our repeated requests to see four American missionaries who had been held for months without charges were always turned down. Appointment requests for visiting U.S. officials were usu- ally put on hold until they arrived in Mozambique, and then we were occasionally told that no appointment could be arranged. A major disappointment was when the government said that a visit from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger would be “inop- portune,” even though we offered two dates for such a visit. That turndown made me ask myself if those opposed to opening an embassy in Mozambique may have been right after all. Meanwhile, the entire embassy staff was being closely watched. This was brought home to me three months or so after I had been at post. I had occasion to call on Pres. Machel to make another pitch for release of the American missionaries, or at least to be told why they were being held. I spoke in Portuguese, of course. After I had finished, Machel complimented me on my progress, which made me feel good—until he added, “But your wife is better.” I had no problem with this, for my wife was indeed better. But then he added, “There are five wives of ambassadors who have taken the trouble to learn and speak our language. The Bulgar- ian ambassador’s wife is best; your wife is second-best, and the Tanzanian ambassador’s wife is third.” Wow! If the president of the country knows this much about the wives of ambassadors, you can imagine how closely you are being watched. Of course, it is possible that Pres. Machel may also have wanted to put me and my staff on notice not to be doing something we didn’t want the government to know about. But after that first difficult year, the chill began to thaw. When our paths crossed at receptions and cocktail parties, Mozambi- can officials seemed more ready to engage in meaningful discus- sions. Ministers and senior government officials also began to Those first 12 to 18 months at post were indeed frustrating. My staff of eight and I seemed to encounter obstacles whatever we tried to do.