The Foreign Service Journal, March 2015

42 MARCH 2015 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL culture and other senior government officials, as well. “You Americans know how to produce food,” Machel stressed. “Nobody is as good at this as you are. The Bulgarians are trying to help us grow food, but they have little to show for their work. In fact, we’re losing money supporting their efforts. Why don’t you come here and help us?” He then asked his agriculture minister: “How many hectares of land in the Incomati River Valley can we let the Americans have?” The minister mentioned some astonishingly high figure, to which Machel interjected, “If that isn’t enough, we’ll double it. Prove that you can do it better than the Bulgarians.” This was an enticing challenge, but one Machel obviously knew we couldn’t accept, given the ban on development assis- tance. Accordingly, I suspect he arranged the meeting to signal that his government was not so committed to Marxism as earlier rhetoric might have led us to believe. Whatever he may have had in mind, the meeting did highlight that disillusionment with their allies was beginning to set in. We had already been hearing from other officials, for example, how disappointed the Mozambicans were with Soviet shrimp fishing off the coast. The Soviets did not appear to be sharing their take with the Mozambicans as they had promised, and their trawling methods were destroying some of the best shrimp-growing areas in the country. All this suggested that the Mozambicans might be more receptive to redressing the imbal- ance in their foreign policy posture. The embassy was eager to test this possibility. The Rhodesian Opening But the development that probably did more than anything else to spur FRELIMO to look for ways to improve its relations with the U.S. was the fact that the war in Rhodesia, which shares an 800-mile border with Mozambique, was not going the way the Machel government had hoped. They had thought that once they became independent and could offer sanctuary and military support to the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army forces engaged in the fighting inside Rhodesia, the war would soon be over. Instead, the white Rhodesian government of Ian Smith began carrying out retaliatory bombings. It also stirred unrest inside Mozambique by supporting dissidents from the former Portuguese forces, a small number of whom had already organized and taken up arms in opposition to the government in Maputo. With no prospect of military victory in sight, Pres. Machel began to explore other ways to bring about a change of govern- ment in Rhodesia. He knew the British, with the encourage- ment of the Carter administration, were seeking to persuade the government of Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to agree to a ceasefire and free and fair supervised elections, with the British agreeing to turn over power to whoever won the election. Pres. Machel decided to explore this option; but to do so, he needed to elicit U.S. cooperation. Fortuitously, on June 7, 1977, President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States would not lift its sanctions against the Rhodesian government. Soon thereafter, Pres. Machel let me know that his government was prepared to work closely with us and the British to bring about a ceasefire and free and fair elections in Rhodesia. He said he hoped we would agree to keep what we were doing out of the public eye. Toward that end, the foreign ministry would not be involved; instead, he designated two of his aides, Sergio Viera and Fernando Hon- wana, to work with us on any actions we might jointly decide to undertake. Machel took these negotiations seriously. He met with the two individuals chosen by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Pres. Carter to brief the interested parties on the progress of the negotiations (Ambassador Stephen Low for the State Depart- ment). Pres. Machel suggested people they might wish to see in support of their negotiations. He also met frequently with my British counterpart in Mozambique, Ambassador John Lewen, and me to offer further suggestions and be brought up-to-date on the state of play. Through these meetings I was able to establish a close work- ing relationship with Machel. At one point, the president called me in, closed the door and asked if I knew of any American who was a friend of Abel Muzorewa, a highly regarded bishop of the With no prospect of military victory in sight, Pres. Machel began to explore other ways to bring about a change of government in Rhodesia.