The Foreign Service Journal, March 2015

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH 2015 43 United Methodist Church who was serving as president of the African National Council, an organization of Rhodesians seeking a political settlement to the fighting in Rhodesia. Machel wanted to send a personal message to the bishop, but did not want to put what he was requesting in writing. He also made clear that if his overture became public, he would deny it. Pres. Machel said he hoped he could dissuade the bishop from joining forces with Joshua Nkomo and other tribal leaders who, Machel thought, would work against what he and we were seeking to accomplish. I knew a few American academics who had become friends of the bishop when he had studied in the United States. One of them came to Maputo and, after hearing what Machel was seeking from Bishop Muzorewa, agreed to deliver the message and to report back to Machel. Though he was disappointed in Muzorewa’s response, Machel’s readiness to turn to us for help on such a sensitive issue is a good indica- tion of how dramatically Mozambican reservations about having anything to do with the United States had changed. Bringing the Parties to the Table In the summer of 1979, the British government concluded that it was time to concentrate on getting all the interested par- ties—Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith; the insurgents, led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo; the South African govern- ment; the United Nations and all the states neighboring on Rho- desia—to commit to a ceasefire. The parties to the agreement would then be responsible for maintaining law and order during a six-month transition to elections, including the demobilization and disarming of the Rhodesian forces and the insurgents. Prime Minister Thatcher invited all the interested parties to a meeting at Lancaster House in London in September. Pres. Machel sent Fernando Honwana as his personal representative. After several days of negotiations, the British called for a vote. All those attending were prepared to sign on. But there was one delegate who refused to sign—Robert Mugabe, leader of the Mozambique-based ZANLA. Mugabe’s concurrence was crucial, for it was his forces that were doing most of the fighting inside Rhodesia. It appeared that the conference would break up with- Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was so appreciative that she invited Mozambique to become a member of the Commonwealth. out agreement; some delegations were already booking tickets to return home. It was at this point that I received a night action cable from the State Department, with instructions from Pres. Carter to ask Pres. Machel if he would intervene and pressure Mugabe to sign onto the negotiated Lancaster House accord. Time was of the essence, since once the delegations departed, it would be dif- ficult to ever reach agreement on a ceasefire and elections. I called Machel’s office at once to request a sit-down, but was told the president was in a Cabinet meeting and a face-to- face would be arranged as soon as he was free. Rather than wait for a return call, I asked if I could go to where he was meeting so I could catch him when he came out. This was granted and, as soon as he spotted me, Machel came over to ask what I was doing there. Once he realized the urgency of my instructions, he didn’t hesitate, but got in touch with Mugabe at once. Pres. Machel wanted a settlement as much as we or the British did. He couldn’t understand why Mugabe was refusing to sign. “He’s won!” exclaimed Machel. “He is Shona, the major tribal group- ing in Rhodesia. ZANLA will win the election.” I immediately returned to the embassy, reporting that Pres. Machel had agreed to do what Pres. Carter had asked him to do. Shortly thereafter, I received a message from Assistant Secre- tary for African Affairs Dick Moose notifying me that agreement had been reached at Lancaster House, and that the British were crediting Machel with having made the difference. I learned later that the British had listened in on Machel’s call to Mugabe, hear- ing the Mozambican president stress even more forcefully the arguments that he used with me that same day for why Mugabe should sign. Prime Minister Thatcher was so appreciative that she invited Mozambique to become a member of the Commonwealth, the first time membership had been offered to a country that was not a former British colony or possession. And, much to the surprise of many, Mozambique agreed to become a member and has been one ever since. Sometimes diplomacy pays big dividends! n