The Foreign Service Journal, March 2016

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH 2016 11 USAIDStressResilience) , we were heart- ened to see it covered in the FSJ ’s January- February issue (Talking Points). Along with the FSJ editorial staff, we believe the well-being of the frontline civilian com- munity merits serious consideration. However, to fully appreciate the report’s findings, it is essential to under- stand the wider context. It would be inaccurate to find fault in any one orga- nization’s handling of operational and deployment stress. In a 2010 report, “Army Health Promo- tion, Risk Reduction, Suicide Prevention,” the former vice chief of staff of the Army, General Peter Chiarelli, went on record stating: “No one could have foreseen the impact of nine years of war on our leaders and soldiers. As a result of the protracted and intense operational tempo, the Army has lost its former situational awareness. …We now must face the unintended consequences of leading an expeditionary Army that included involuntary enlist- ment extensions, acceler- ated promotions, extended deployment rotations. … ” USAID’s workforce faces strikingly similar circumstances: an unprecedented expeditionary focus, intense operational tempo, accelerated promotions and mul- tiple assignments in demanding environ- ments. But our study shows that USAID faces another pincer arm—the post-9/11 difficulties that all relief and development partner organizations are suffering. Anyone seeking to comprehend this dual layer of strain for USAID should consider the following conditions (often beyond the agency’s control): 1) After the 9/11 attacks, USAID has been tasked in unprecedented ways to respond programmatically to a new set of security-related foreign policy priori- ties, amplifying objectives such as crisis response and stabilization. Precipitous shifts in budgetary imperatives and strategic focus have necessitated surges in staffing to meet urgent and often unantici- pated needs, creating significant internal stress. 2) Numerous mandatory regulations governing USAID operations are based on the stable-state programming assump- tions in which traditional development interventions thrive. While USAID staff have shown grit in meeting the challenges of the “new normal” programming in un- stable operating environments (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen), this has taken a human toll. 3) Other agencies and Congress impose constraints on USAID that often inhibit effective manage- ment or achievement of its objec- tives. Budgetary and other critical decisions are often made over which USAID has no influence or control. Along with the massive amounts of foreign assistance funding for crises and stabiliza- tion operations come increased oversight and political scrutiny. Yet staff comple- ments are not necessarily increased to meet these operational demands; instead, personnel are asked to “step up.” The crisis among frontline civilians is real, and it has critical implications. As detailed in our report, it is part of a larger problem for all organizations operating in this delicate space. Solu- tions require sensitive and nuanced policies on USAID’s part and thought- ful collaboration its from partners. The agency has begun work on its share of that task, but the road ahead will require a commitment at senior levels across government to support all those who