The Foreign Service Journal, March 2017

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH 2017 15 system in order to maintain political order. With such foundational rigidities, the issue of economic reform always had profound and risky political implica- tions. Underlying Forces at Work The dilemma facing Soviet leaders in the last years was clear. The system was dying and shortages were every- where; economic autarky had even begun to set in. Living standards were falling, and factories became desperate as promised inputs and outputs evaporated. The economic competition with the West was clearly lost, and the Soviet military and space program only excelled due to excessive, vampire-like skewing of resources to them by a command system, which left the rest of the economy resem- bling an impoverished, cadaverous third- world country. In other words, Gorbachev had no choice but to attempt reform; but that, in turn, would also loosen the shack- les of centralized political control. Under such dire systemic circum- stances and historic internal contradic- tions, I do not think any kind of addi- tional, last-minute “vital aid” from the West could have created a positive inflec- tion point for the USSR’s future. The cumulative consequences of decades of baked-in structural economic inefficien- cies and rigidities created a complex, destabilizing morass and a tsunami of economic and social problems that made Gorbachev’s perestroika , in any format, highly unlikely to succeed. There was also inadequate apprecia- tion in the West for the massive, self- destructive underlying forces at work in the Soviet Union. “Shock therapy,” as suggested by well-intended Western economists, could not be successful as outlined, and we so advised Washington. However, I do agree with one of Mr. Gorbachev’s remarks in that Dec. 12 interview, that the Soviet Union “ate itself.” Near the end, it was, indeed, like watching a rapacious, wounded shark eat its own entrails. Throughout the three years I was in charge of the economic, commercial and labor reporting from Moscow, we tried to weigh objectively for Washing- ton each of a long parade of successive economic reform packages, including versions of the famous “500 Days” reform program. But correctly, albeit often with a sense of regret, we had to conclude and report every time and for many reasons that none of them were going to work. Truth-Telling Under Pressure This brings me to the second reason for this letter. The dynamic within Embassy Moscow and in Washington during most of my tenure was often that the Economic Section was too aggressive in signaling serious Soviet economic and social-stabil- ity-related problems and dangers. But our section lived amidst the evi- dence of growing social and economic disarray every day. For years, my trusty small band pushed and prodded, and at times was quite frustrated trying to raise embassy and Washington concerns about growing instability—and not just about the economy. Tom Delare showed great intellectual rigor and courage. Ross Wilson (later ambassador to Turkey) did yeoman’s work for years, as did other economic officers. The labor upheaval and growing soci-