The Foreign Service Journal, March 2020

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH 2020 25 Vladivostok and Yekaterinburg in Russia. It was a major achievement of the U.S. Foreign Service. The new embassies and consulates posi- tioned the United States on the ground through- out the Eurasian landmass to promote American interests. In Kyiv, the United States had already established a consulate general in February 1991, but then upgraded it to an embassy on Jan. 23, 1992, when the U.S. and Ukraine established full diplomatic relations. Efforts to manage this two-pronged policy in Eurasia have continued under every U.S. administration, Republican and Democratic, for the past three decades. Initially, the United States was able to balance the relationship reasonably well, but over time this balancing act became more difficult. Despite the formal recognition of Ukrainian independence by Yeltsin, many in the Russian political elite, particularly in the security services and the military, never accommodated them- selves to Ukraine’s independence. While the Yeltsin government officially signed onto the 1994 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, guaranteeing sovereignty for all states of the former Soviet Union, the so-called Russian power-ministries (supported by politicians like the late Moscowmayor, Yuri Luzhkov) continued to work in Crimea and other areas such as Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in ways that undercut those principles. I witnessed a very candid example of attitudes among the Russian elite at a farewell reception in June 1999, when I was completing my assignment as deputy chief of mission in Moscow and returning to Washington to prepare for a new assignment as ambassador to Lithuania. A senior Russian official with whom I had worked came up to me, toasted me with a shot of vodka and said: “Well, John, good luck in Lithuania. You know we always understood that the Baltic nations were different, unlike Ukraine and Georgia—which, of course, are part of Russia.” Even most members of the Russian elite who recognized Ukraine’s independence saw Ukraine as an integral part of Russia’s history and wanted to keep it within Russia’s sphere of influence. They resented efforts by the United States and the European Union to offer Ukraine a place in a broader Europe. v Amore assertive Russian policy toward Ukraine slowly emerged after Vladimir Putin succeeded Yeltsin as president. During the first decade of the 21st century, Russia’s economy had steadily improved due tomassive profits from the extraction of oil and natural gas. Russian resentment against American policy and its desire to reassert itself on the world stage grew correspondingly. At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin launched a broad- based diatribe against U.S. foreign policy, criticizing the United States for its development of ballistic missile defenses, its military actions in Iraq, NATO expansion and promoting democracy within Russia’s legitimate sphere of influence. Putin’s desire to keep the United States and Europe out of the “Near Abroad” grewmore pronounced. This approach had been strongly influenced by his negative reaction to the Western- supported Orange Revolution in Ukraine in late 2004. Putin was personally stung when Ukraine’s Supreme Court blocked the cor- rupt election of Putin’s favored candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, and ordered a new election that paved the way for Viktor Yushchenko to be elected president. This “colored revolution” came to be seen as a seminal event by many in the Russian elite. Reflecting their lack of understanding of real democracy, some believed that the Protest against joining NATO, organized by Viktor Yanukovych's party, in Kyiv’s Maidan Square in 2005. ARTHURBONDAR A close-up of Crimea, showing Ukraine and Russia. RADIOFREEEUROPE/RADIOLIBERTY