The Foreign Service Journal, March 2020

28 MARCH 2020 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL v Ukrainian patriotism and a deepening national conscious- ness are no longer simply major issues emanating from the tra- ditional hotbeds of Ukrainian nationalism in the western regions of the country. They now increasingly emanate from the entire nation, particularly frommany among the younger generation who do not have the memories of the Soviet Union shared by their parents and grandparents. At the same time, the number of Ukrainians supporting inte- gration into Europe has grown. It is now easier to obtain a visa and travel to Europe, including visa-free trips to E.U. member countries for many categories of travelers. Other benefits of the association agreement signed by former President Petro Porosh- enko in Brussels on June 27, 2014, are also being felt in Ukraine. This was a major goal of Ukraine during and after the Orange Revolution and remained so during much of the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych (February 2010-February 2014). During my tenure as ambassador to Ukraine, which coincided with Yanukovych’s presidency, Ukraine and the E.U. had negotiated an association agreement and a comprehensive free trade agree- ment with support from the United States. Yanukovych’s sudden reversal in November 2013—when he decided not to sign the association agreement and instead seek membership in the Russian Eurasian Union in exchange for a $15 billion loan from Russia—had shocked the Ukrainian population. It led to the protests on the Maidan Square in Kyiv, followed by violent repression of the protest by the regime, Yanu- kovych’s flight to Russia and, subsequently, the Russian invasion of Crimea and military operation in the Donbas. During my time in Kyiv, the Ukrainian people had increas- ingly seen ties to the European Union as not only realizing the European destiny of Ukraine, but as a means of introducing the rule of law inside Ukraine itself and eliminating unchecked cor- ruption by Ukrainian and Russian oligarchs. For years Ukrainian governments had been pressured by Moscow to do its bidding, particularly in the energy sector. Ukraine has been a major tran- sit country for sending Russian gas to Europe. Ukrainian busi- nessmen made deals with Russian state firms, raking off profits as middlemen from the transshipment of energy across Ukraine. Ironically, Russia’s proxy war in the Donbas and its approach to Ukraine over the last six years have themselves helped forge a much stronger and more widely shared sense of national identity, and contributed to even greater popular support for Ukraine’s independence and for greater integration with the West. Russian actions in Crimea and the Donbas in 2014 caused a sharp drop in the number of Ukrainians who had a positive attitude toward Russia. Frommore than 90 percent during the 2008-2010 period, it fell to as low as 24 percent in early 2014. Attitudes seem to have improved somewhat this year, how- ever. On Oct. 15, 2019, The Moscow Times reported the results of a joint study done by the independent Russian Levada Center and Ukraine’s Kiev International Institute of Sociology, which found that attitudes toward each other’s country seem to be In Putin’s view, things went from bad to worse when Yushchenko sought Ukrainian integration with Europe and NATO. The Ukrainian Army 53rd Brigade in Donbas, February 2016. ARTHURBONDAR