The Foreign Service Journal, March 2020

32 MARCH 2020 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL v As I look back on my experiences dealing with both Russia and Ukraine, three factors stand out. First, most Russian officials with whom I worked when I was ambassador in Moscow had a limited understanding of how Ukraine has changed over the past three decades. Serving in Ukraine immediately before the Russian seizure of Crimea and aggression in the Donbas, and then serving in Moscow for three years soon thereafter, brought home to me on an almost daily basis the gap between the mythic Ukraine and the reality of modern Ukraine. Russians often looked at their Ukrainian “cous- ins” through an imperial prism and did not recognize the true nature of independence that has developed in the nation. In particular, many of the assumptions underlying Russia’s invasion of the Donbas were mistaken, notably that Ukraine’s Russian speakers all wanted to be a part of Russia. For example, the idea that Russian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians living in south- (Above) Border guard patrol boats and a brand new Russian battleship in Sevastopol Bay in Crimea, 2019. (Right) Russian Navy warships and Russian soldiers on an auxiliary fast boat in Sevastopol, 2019. ARTHURBONDAR ern Ukraine bordering the Black Sea would welcome becoming a part of a land bridge linking Crimea with Donbas as part of a new “Novorossiya” was based on the mistaken notion that these people wanted to be a part of a “New Russia.” This idea is rooted in a history of the conquest of this region by Catherine the Great and Potemkin in the 18th century, and bears little resemblance to contemporary Ukraine. Moreover, I don’t believe most official Russians have any real understanding of the attitudes of Ukrai- nian young people. Second, Vladimir Putin and the elite currently ruling Russia still cling to the notion that Russia can reassert its imperial-style control over Ukraine, Georgia and other independent nations of the former Soviet Union. While the annexation of Crimea was extremely popular inside Russia in the aftermath of the invasion, the people seem to be tiring of the unending war in the Donbas and the steadily declining standard of living that has character- ized Russia since 2014. This was caused, in part, by the imposi- tion of economic sanctions by the West as a response to Russian aggression. Third, underlying the Russian-Ukrainian struggle has been an effort in both countries to find a new post-Soviet national identity in the modern world. Beyond the larger geopolitical struggle, the quest to define who is a modern Russian and who is a modern Ukrainian has turned out to be a long process. The conceptions and myths involved in this effort in both countries are many. Both want to root their national identity in the past, but the future they then envision for their nation is starkly dif- ferent. Putin and the ruling elite of Russia see the future as a resurrection of their country as a great power, with imperial-style sway over their former dominion (it is unclear how many Rus- sians share this view). Ukrainians, on the other hand, see their future as a part of Western politics and culture, as the geopoliti- cal pivot between East and West. ARTHURBONDAR With U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry looking on, Russian President Vladimir Putin, at right, greets U.S. Ambassador John Tefft prior to their meeting in the Kremlin on Dec. 15, 2015. U.S.DEPARTMENTOFSTATE