The Foreign Service Journal, March 2020

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH 2020 37 advanced Western countries as an undeserving upstart, a barbarian, or some such. These days, great power status implies a high degree of national sovereignty, resilience in the face of outside pressure, and freedom of action. In the past, Russia has been willing to pay a high price rather than submit to foreign dominance. World War II—or the Great Patriotic War against Hitler’s invasion, as the Russians refer to it—is a prime exam- ple. The experience of that war, with its untold tragedies and ultimate triumph, is the most sacred part of Russia’s collective memory. Except in the early post-revolutionary period, Russia’s foreign policy has been squarely built on the principles of realpolitik. What matters most is one’s power and one’s will. The weak get beaten; the cowards are cowed. A sound foreign policy is guided by national interests, and requires sobriety and pragmatism. Russia’s preferred model of global governance is a concert of powers, as after the Vienna Congress of 1814-1815 or the Yalta Conference of 1945. Indeed, the United Nations Security Council, where five permanent members decide jointly on the most crucial security issues in the world, is an ideal model in Moscow’s eyes. True, Russia cannot impose its will on others; but, more important, it can prevent any decision that would not agree with its interests. With bitter memories of communism still fresh, Russian leaders deem all ideologies misleading, and believe that high-sounding values often reveal themselves as hypocritical. In this, basic Russian cynicism about international relations inevitably clashes with what Russians perceive as Western hypocrisy. This reveals itself most starkly in Russia’s attitude toward U.S. democracy promotion. Even though this endeavor is very different in form and results from the Soviet-era promotion of communism, Russians believe that it conveniently combines ideological needs with geopolitical advantages. Just as any newly established communist regime in the past looked up to Moscow for guidance and support, so new democracies, they argue, seek to curry favor with the United States to consolidate their power and protect their security. Ukraine Is More Than a Foreign Policy Matter Moscow does not care much about—and does not think much of—nascent democracy in Georgia or Ukraine, where it prefers to see mostly chaos, oligarchy and mob rule; but it is wary of U.S. military presence and activities in its neighborhood and Washington’s virtually unconditional support for Russian neighbors’ historical or current grievances against Russia.