The Foreign Service Journal, March 2021

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH 2021 17 limiting political ambassadors, and the Harvard Belfer Center report calls for a 10 percent cap on them. The Foreign Service Act of 1980 tried to address this question by stating clearly: “Contributions to political campaigns should not be a factor in the appointment of an individual as chief of mission.”That stipulation brought about only a very small reduction in the percentage. None of the presidents since Richard Nixon have adhered to it, and the selling of ambassa- dorships, a thinly veiled form of corrup- tion, remains a regular American exercise that no other developed democracy practices. This needs to stop. Since 1980 the percentage of political ambassadors generally hovered around 30 percent, with the exception of the Reagan administration, which bumped it up to 38 percent by sending noncareer ambas- sadors to places like Malawi and Rwanda. During the Trump era, it reached a post– World War II high of 43 percent. So who the president is matters. A numerical limit on the number of political appointees would be hard to get through Congress, however. It might not withstand a challenge to its constitutional- ity; nor does it address the quality prob- lem. A better approach would be to ensure more transparency and accountability when it comes to ambassadors—both political appointees and career officers. The certificates of competence the State Department sends to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for each nominee to be ambassador, and puts on the department’s website, should include all political donations by the nominee and his or her immediate family for the last 10 years. The certificate should also include test scores from the Foreign Service Insti- tute to demonstrate the degree to which the nominee can speak the local language. And it should describe in detail how the nominee acquired “knowledge and understanding of the history, the culture, the economic and political institutions, and the interests of that country and its people,” which is also required by the 1980 act. That would at least provide more transparency. Accountability could be achieved if State’s inspector general sent a short email questionnaire every year to all Americans working in every embassy asking how well the mission is run. Those ambassadors with low scores would get a quick visit from a pair of senior inspectors, who would then write up a report with recommendations for how to improve the situation. Like embassy inspections (which only happen once every 10 years even though they are supposed to happen every five years), those reports would be posted on the IG’s website for all to see. If aspiring ambassadors knew that their performance will be judged in a very public way, fewer of those whose only qualification is their wealth would apply. Another way to improve the perfor- mance of noncareer ambassadors would be to insist they actually spend some time learning about the State Department, the people who work in an embassy and the problems they will face in their coun- tries. Currently they attend a three-week “charm school,” and then they are off to post. Why not require them to spend four to six months taking courses at FSI, especially those with no experience in government or the military and little to no ability in the local language? Solutions Seeking Problems Some 2021 suggestions are not well thought out. Consider the proposal to establish a programmodeled on the military’s Reserve Officer Training Corps. The military selects students as they enter college, provides funding for part or all of their undergraduate education, and requires training courses taught on cam- pus by military officers as well as military training in the summer. Upon graduation the student receives a commission as a second lieutenant (or ensign) and has a five-year obligation to serve in the U.S. armed forces. Such a program applied to State would be expensive, and it would produce junior officers with far less education, experience and maturity than those who are cur- rently selected. Average entrants into the Foreign Service today are in their 30s, have a master’s degree and six years of work experience and, often, have also served in the Peace Corps or the military. State rightly does not want to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars bringing people on board and training them, only to have them arrive at their first post and decide they don’t like the life they have found. An 18-year-old college freshman does not have anywhere near enough of a record to enable State to make a judgment on whether they are right for the Foreign Service or not. Moreover, what problem is a ROTC- type program trying to solve?The number of applicants to take the Foreign Service exam was down in recent years, no doubt because of President Donald Trump’s contempt for government service in general and the State Department in particular. But that will change under the Biden administration, and there will Speaking Out is the Journal ’s opinion forum, a place for lively discussion of issues affecting the U.S. Foreign Service and American diplomacy. The views expressed are those of the author; their publication here does not imply endorse- ment by the American Foreign Service Association. Responses are welcome; send them to journal@afsa.org.