The Foreign Service Journal, March 2021

20 MARCH 2021 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL violent demonstrations were all too frequent, they were gener- ally ineffective because of the new facilities. Congress generously funded additional security assets such as security officers, armored vehicles and bodyguards to enhance mobility and travel outside our secure platforms. State has a remarkable record of conducting literally millions of moves outside the secure perimeter at our highest-threat posts with few losses, albeit using helicopters or heavily armed and armored convoys. Despite these successes, at critical and high-threat posts members of the Foreign Service are rarely allowed to travel to meet sources, colleagues, counterparts or development partners in less than fully secured areas; nor are they allowed to move to unscheduled locations or travel to sites that are not fully secured. Thus, their ability to meet discreetly with subjects and sources or review remote programs is often very limited, as is their ability to observe and report on a country they are sup- posed to know with a high level of expertise. This is not the case with our U.S. military partners or members of the intelligence community. They, like the FBI and Drug Enforcement Agency, among others, all have different requirements for managing accountability and risk than the foreign affairs agencies have. This disparity has led many officers—senior, midlevel and entry-level alike—to conclude that the call to make the security of our officers the highest priority has seriously undermined our ability to carry out what should and must be our highest prior- ity—namely, fulfilling the national security and foreign affairs goals of the United States. They believe this is a problem that needs to be addressed urgently. Risk Management Evaluated The American Academy of Diplomacy pulled together an advisory group of senior retired officials to look specifically at this issue and established the project on risk management. The advisory group is led by many former senior diplomats with extensive experience in high- and critical-threat missions, as well as two other former assistant secretaries for diplomatic security. Based on their previous experience as ambassadors and assistant secretaries in the Department of State, advisory group members report that chiefs of mission (COMs), deputy chiefs of mission (DCMs) and regional security officers (RSOs) operate today on the assumption that decisions made to allow travel outside the mission in high-threat environments that then result in death or serious injury will be judged in terms of accountabil- ity, with the presumption that someone erred in their judgment. Too frequently, they note, the decision by COMs, DCMs and RSOs at critical-threat posts is to avoid risk by denying a travel request. The deciding officials feel compelled to be able to demonstrate that the purpose of the travel outweighs the risk of injury. Approving travel to a location that is anything other than a fortified compound, usually a host-government compound for meetings with host-government officials, is difficult to justify when the risk is high and security protocols cannot be met. When the travel is to locations that are not secured, for meetings with individuals who are not host-government officials—what we would categorize as important but normal diplomatic and programmatic activities—a request is virtually impossible to approve under current conditions. The result, in short, is that the formulation and execution of national security policy is hindered by the lack of access to foreign contacts. While acknowledging that there are increased threats and dangers for staff operating in high-threat countries, the security versus risk equation for travel outside our missions is too heavily weighted toward eliminating risk to our person- nel. Underlying this assessment is a basic judgment that the first function of our diplomats is to serve American national interests and policy goals. Diplomats are not soldiers, and every effort should be made to mitigate risk. But when security is defined as the first priority —as it too often has been—they are unable to perform their mission, and the basic purpose of hav- ing diplomats abroad is undermined. Risk aversion at higher-threat posts obstructs the perfor- mance of the most basic functions of a diplomat abroad. Those functions—to influence host governments and other foreign interlocutors; to explain, defend and advance U.S. policies and objectives; and to gain the information and access needed to analyze political, social, economic and programmatic develop- ments based on firsthand contacts and observations in a foreign country—all require personal contact. Diplomacy is an incremental business in which numer- ous contacts and observations contribute over time to gener- ate larger results. Diplomats are analysts, policy influencers, persuaders and negotiators. Secure telephone technology Risk aversion at higher-threat posts obstructs the performance of the most basic functions of a diplomat abroad.