The Foreign Service Journal, March 2021

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH 2021 21 and advances such as video calls and video conferencing can supplement traditional meetings. But they cannot substitute for building personal relations and trust with foreign contacts, without which real understanding of sensitive issues is not possible. This is particularly true when the sensitivities concern internal foreign political concerns. There are reasons for this state of affairs, but AAD believes that change is needed. In discussion, we agreed that one of the major factors in keeping diplomats cloistered is the language and structure of the Accountability Review Board provision in the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. That law is widely interpreted within the Foreign Service as possessing an overriding requirement to find someone at fault if there is a security incident involving serious injury or loss of life; the first determination after identifying whether injury or loss of life is a security issue is whether the security systems and procedures at that mission were adequate. Since the systems in place when life is lost are almost never deemed “adequate,” this formulation leads inevitably to the issue of “who was accountable.” In 1986, when the act was passed, there was a view in Congress, shared by many in the Foreign Service, that the State Department was not taking security sufficiently seriously. Since then, however, much has changed. Security has been greatly improved. At the same time, today effective diplomacy to meet national interests requires finding a way to engage more broadly, even in high-threat locations. We believe it is possible. Progress will need change in three areas simultaneously. Three Areas for Change First, the language and structure of the Accountability Review Board mandated in the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 must be reformulated. AAD does not equate the levels of acceptable risk for the Foreign Ser- vice abroad with the levels of risk acceptable for U.S. military assets engaged in combat operations. However, Foreign Service officers are frequently assigned to high-threat diplomatic mis- sions abroad, and they understand there are risks that must be accepted. Currently, embassies are hampered by an out-of-date accountability process that is essentially at odds with the cur- rent requirement to take reasonable risks in the performance of duty. AAD recommends a reformulation of the law to put in place a system similar to that of other executive agencies. In the event of a serious security incident, such a system would call for an internal review to evaluate precautions taken against known risks and to evaluate lessons learned in a report to the Secretary of State who would, in turn, inform Congress of the results. This review would take into account the need to take reasonable risks balanced against the understanding of threats known at the time. This would bring the process more in line with that used by the Department of Defense and the intelligence community. Equally important, it would be a tangible message to the U.S. Foreign Service that Congress understands and supports the need to take reasonable risks in the performance of diplomatic and foreign aid operations abroad. It would signal that Congress wants to assist in developing a culture where the security of our personnel remains important, but the priority must be imple- menting the foreign affairs policies and operations of the United States. Second, the Department of State must identify best practices and new techniques on how to operate in high-threat locations. Certain cadres of officers—including political officers, consular officers, USAID field and project officers, and others—would receive required training in advanced operational techniques and procedures to allow them to operate as safely as possible while accepting increased levels of risk. This will take a joint effort by the Foreign Service Institute, the Foreign Affairs Secu- rity Training Center (FASTC) and other agencies to determine best practices. In addition, management officers at various lev- els will require additional training in managing threats and risk. Finally, the culture of risk aversion that has taken hold in the foreign affairs agencies over years must be addressed to imple- ment legal changes and improved tactics and procedures. This will require both education and hard skills training. Senior and midlevel officers serving domestically and in overseas positions will require improved education in how to identify and man- age threats and risks while balancing the need to fulfill foreign affairs goals and objectives. Decision-makers responsible for approving operations abroad that entail higher risk (normally DCMs and RSOs) must have more than just new tools and training. They must also have confidence that the foreign affairs agencies and Congress understand that the highest priority is fulfilling major national security priorities, not solely keeping people safe. Careful judgment of the importance of individual policy objectives balanced with risk and threat mitigation measures will always be necessary and never clear-cut in the process of approving a plan or activity. All aspects of the problem—impor- tance of the goals, risk and mitigation—must be part of the judgment when things go wrong. n