The Foreign Service Journal, March 2021

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH 2021 51 Make Démarches Count How to leverage the value added of the Foreign Service? Find and repeat one of former Under Secretary of State for Political AffairsThomas Pickering’s first instructions to posts on assuming his position. In that message, Pickering urged embassy officers to creatively modify, edit and craft démarches for maximum impact on receiv- ing governments, not simply mechanically transmit démarches as received fromWashington. Neil Silver is a retired FSO in McLean, Virginia. Create Diplomatic “Special Forces” Reinvigorating the Department of State diplomatic corps requires new thinking and a commitment to grassroots, person- to-person engagements, including to traditional leaders, village chiefs, elders and influencers far from national capitals and host-nation state houses. We need to establish the equivalent of “diplomatic special forces” like the Green Berets. Such “Diplomatic Expeditionary Field Teams” would accept Foreign Service volunteers willing to undergo rigorous physical and advanced operational training to allow small four-member groups to operate independently in the most unstable, remote and challenging environments. I have created much of this curricu- lum, elements of which are covered in my textbook, Humanitar- ians in Hostile Territory: Expeditionary Diplomacy and Aid Outside the Green Zone (University of Chicago Press, 2010). Reactions at State to the concept of DEFTs range from “our FSOs already do this in places like Iraq” to “embassies don’t have this mission.” Yet our ability to engage in remote, deployed, grassroots diplomacy will determine future foreign policy success. And longer-term remote outreach missions require more specialized skill sets and resources than civ-mil and Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training currently provides. This recommendation is based on my own experience—in Afghanistan three times and in Iraq four times under various auspices, most recently serving at Provincial Reconstruction Team-Anbar (2007-2008). In prior work at Firebase Anaconda in Tirin Kowt, Afghanistan, I engaged in shura councils and interviewed the local mayor in 2004 in Mullah Omar’s birth- place. In Iraq in 2005, I deployed with Romanian special forces teams. In my assessment of each of these assignments, the need for a more robust diplomatic presence by specially skilled State Department officers was obvious and prominent. Diplomatic special forces–type teams will greatly enhance our engagement in nonpermissive areas of operation, providing reporting for policymakers with unique perspectives and assess- ments created well beyond U.S. fortress embassies. During one of my seminar briefings at the Defense Institute for Security Assis- tance Management, our military counterparts were enthusiastic about the DEFTs concept for diplomatic personnel. This would make FSOs much better partners for civ-mil cooperation. It is time to formally add this “special forces” element to the Department of State’s overseas arsenal. Derrin R. Smith is a recently retired State Department FSO living in Alexandria, Virginia. Let Us Imagine Imagine the United States influencing other nations through dialogue, not dictate. Imagine the United States presupposing mutual respect and understanding even when these two do not presume agreement. Imagine the United States viewing reconciliation as a sign of strength rather than a sign of weakness. Imagine the United States advocating a touch of humility in place of the heavy hand of hubris. Imagine the United States putting itself in the shoes and bare feet of immigrants and their children. Imagine the United States as a builder of bridges, not walls. To achieve the above: Imagine the United States with President Biden at the helmwho reflects the above approaches to foreign policy. Peter Spalding is a retired Senior Foreign Service officer in Washington, D.C. Lead from the Front The Biden administration should reserve judgment on revers- ing any of the Trump administration’s foreign policy initiatives until it has had time to examine them closely, especially for issues demanding close coordination with allies and friendly powers. For example, quickly rejoining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action might be attractive to many of those former Obama administration officials reprising their service with a Biden National Security Council and State Department, but precipitous actions without involving allies and regional stakeholders would only compound the current difficulties of limiting Iranian ambi- tions regarding nuclear weapons. Likewise, for efforts to forestall