The Foreign Service Journal, March 2021

90 MARCH 2021 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL crises, where there was limited discus- sion of foreign policy—in particular, the growing risks of nuclear proliferation. The report begins with an update on the faltering multilateral system that works to retard, roll back or prevent proliferation and to cap the number of nations with such weapons. The authors abjure the demonization around the lightning-rod cases of North Korea and Iran. Rather, they step back to focus on the underlying changes that might acceler- ate broader proliferation. They cogently review the current system, point out some of its successes and suggest how it is unraveling. In doing so, they identify seven broad interacting trends, and proceed to evaluate three countries— South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Turkey— against them. The trends include increasing regional tensions that drive prolifera- tion pressures, waning faith in America’s reliability, a retreat from disarmament by the United States and Russia, a multiplicity of providers of civil nuclear technology, the eroding strength of eco- nomic sanctions, and more competitive relationships between the United States, Russia and China. Given such factors, other potential breakout candidates come to mind, such as Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. They face an increasingly assertive neighbor in China. Egypt, led by an authoritar- ian leader with regional ambitions, is another. Since the end of World War II, a patchwork of arrangements used incen- tives and deterrents to retard prolif- eration. Carrots helped states access peaceful nuclear uses with the major powers promising to roll back stock- piles. Missile and weapons technology know-how was tightly controlled by applying or threatening sanctions, using various human and technical verifica- tion approaches and, most importantly, with America offering an “umbrella” of protection. This systemmostly worked, but there were serious failures (e.g., Pakistan, India, Israel, North Korea) and near- catastrophes such as the Cuban missile crisis. The efficacy of this architecture was higher during the Cold War, espe- cially in bilateral arms reduction agree- ments between the United States and Russia—the so-called balance of terror. The report teases out newer desta- bilizing factors. China is one—more aggressive, an economic powerhouse and growing its military capabilities. Russia is another—less economically successful, but rearming and reassertive. And then there is the United States. Trends of pulling back that began before the Trump administration and wan- ing influence have accelerated, which is deeply unsettling to our allies. They worry that they can’t count on our shield. That anxiety encourages hedging strategies that could include nuclear weapons. Bilateral arms control agree- ments with the Russians have been Trends of pulling back that began before the Trump administration and waning influence have accelerated, which is deeply unsettling to our allies. unravelling. A new and more expensive arms race is on. The United States spends about half of the global military budget. But size may not be a good proxy for safety. Russia, too, has a large program. These asymmetries complicate trilateral disarmament efforts. A dangerous dynamic is unfolding that dramatically increases the risks of acci- dental miscalculations and war. While those factors stew, there are other challenges. Many new systems have dual uses, which makes verification over- sight harder, although some technology enables better monitoring. Other sticks are losing their efficacy. Authoritarian leaders can work around sanctions and oversight. America’s edge in the market for peaceful uses, a lever for restraining tech transfer, has withered. The authors see no easy paths going forward. But they do make an eloquent argument for U.S. engagement. America alone is not a sound foundation for our national security. Possible lines to explore require flexibility, respect for adversaries and allies, a willingness to keep talking to them, even in the face of sometimes unfortunate acts, and a recog- nition that suboptimal agreements may be as good as they can be for now. That buys time to work to alter the underlying adverse dynamics. The alternatives are grim. The new administration would benefit from studying this report and acting on its findings. Diplomats and other citizens need to keep attention focused on these critical issues. n Walter E. North is a retired USAID Foreign Service officer and a former ambassador.