The Foreign Service Journal, March 2021

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH 2021 97 substantial contribution, and I traveled to many European capitals in a success- ful effort to raise some $30 million for the effort. Getting the money was only part of the problem, however. I then had to negotiate an agreement with the Russians on how they would receive and use the funds. The donor states understandably wanted to make sure their contributions went for the designated purpose, not just into the Rus- sian state budget. We also had to agree with the Russians on innumerable specific questions (e.g., howmuch would we pay to destroy a tank, or to ship it back to Russia?). Finally, we needed to agree on how the process would be inspected, so that accomplishment of the task could be properly verified. I spent almost a week in Moscow in late 2000 negotiating a comprehensive agreement. The Russian Foreign Ministry gave me the use of an office on the sixth floor of its headquarters, along with a computer. I met regularly with about two dozen officers and lawyers from the min- istries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. We agreed on prices, timing and inspection, using personnel from the OSCE mission to Moldova and—in Russia—interna- tional staff from NATO’s arms control unit, all under the auspices of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. s As the effort began in earnest in 2001, we had to overcome significant local resistance from the Transdniestrian authorities. Some opposed the Russian withdrawal because they believed it would leave them with less protection in their dispute with the recognized govern- ment of Moldova. Others probably hoped to gain financially by selling some of the military equipment. Both the Russian commander and I were hanged in effigy by angry crowds in Transdniestria, but strong interven- tion from the Russian deputy minister of defense and former Prime Minis- ter Evgeniy Primakov, Putin’s special representative for the Transdniestrian conflict, helped to overcome the local resistance. By the end of 2001, more than 500 pieces of heavy military weaponry were destroyed or removed fromMoldova, along with far greater stores of non- combat and logistical equipment and supplies. Russia received a one-year extension at the 2002 OSCE Summit, and in early 2003 efforts began in earnest to withdraw the ammunition from the Rus- sian base in the village of Colbasna on the border with Ukraine. Contrary to some prognostications, in roughly six months more than 20,000 metric tons of ammunition were removed to Russia and fully verified under the procedures negotiated in 2000. s Unfortunately, a dispute over the failure of a proposed political settle- ment negotiated unilaterally by Russia in November 2003 halted ammunition withdrawals in early 2004, and they have not resumed. A negligible Russian force of 1,500 troops remains in Moldova’s Transdniestrian region. Nonetheless, I do not consider this effort from 1999 to 2003 a failure. The major Russian weapons were all removed, as were many of the troops. The danger of armed conflict, especially accidental conflict with Russia, was greatly reduced. With the involvement and leadership of American diplomats, this region—and, as a result, Europe and the United States— was a bit safer for a time. n The separatist enclave of Transdniestria in Moldova. ENCYCLOPÆDIABRITANNICA