The Foreign Service Journal, March 2022

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH 2022 13 LETTERS-PLUS Regarding Moscow Signal BY JON LECHEVET RESPONSE TO JANUARY-FEBRUARY FEATURE, “BEFORE HAVANA SYNDROME, THERE WAS MOSCOW SIGNAL” Jon LeChevet retired as a Senior Foreign Service of- ficer in 2005 after a 21-year career. His overseas tours were in Moscow (with Jim Schumaker) and Nairobi, and he held sev- eral senior management positions within the Diplomatic Security Service. He has a Ph.D. in physics. J im Schumaker’s article con- cerning Havana syndrome and a possible linkage to the Moscow microwaves of the Cold War period in the January- February edition of the Journal is a tan- talizing piece. Its thrust is to link the two phenomena and to infer that microwaves have caused medically significant dam- age to embassy personnel. I was directly involved with the Mos- cow microwaves during my career with State and subsequent tours with agencies in the intelligence community (IC) and have a much different perspective. My training and passion concern science and reason, not politics, so I have a different analysis than Jim does. I base my conclu- sions on facts and evidence, not specula- tion or uncorroborated reporting. The Department of State investigated and documented the Moscow Unidenti- fied Technical Signals (MUTS) from 1973 until the signal disappeared (by 1992). I was personally responsible for this mis- sion from 1977 to 1980 and can state with certainty that the intensity of the imping- ing signals were kept at or below a level of 10 microwatts per square centimeter during this time. This level was agreed to by the Soviets because it was their maximum exposure level for incidental, non-ionizing radiation, and deliberately exposing embassy personnel to levels above their own safe level was not in their best interest. Whenever we detected a level above this trigger point (it did happen, but only by a factor of two or three, at most, and for short periods), the Soviets were informed of our displeasure and the pos- sible negative impact of keeping a higher- than-agreed-to level. In all cases, the level promptly fell. The level in the working spaces of the embassy was further reduced by a fac- tor of 10 to 100 as a consequence of the shielding effect of the building itself. The level fell further in 1976 with the addition of copper screening over the windows, resulting in only about 1 percent of the impinging radiation reaching the office areas. People working on the higher floors of the embassy were exposed to a level of about 0.1 microwatts per square centimeter, and there was a much lower level of exposure in the residential sec- tions of the building and the lower floors. Put in Perspective To put this in perspective, a person standing three feet from a Wi-Fi router could be exposed to a radiation level of 0.9 microwatts per square centimeter. A person using a cell phone could have the central portion of the brain exposed to a level of over 1,000 microwatts per square centimeter. Each of these is well in excess of the levels experienced by a person working in the secure section of Embassy Moscow, but we seem to accept this exposure with little, if any, fear. Today, a person walking around lower Manhattan would be exposed to a higher radiation level from cell phone towers, microcells, communication links and other radiators than the people who worked in Embassy Moscow. Further, there is overwhelming evidence that the purpose of the MUTS was to disrupt potential interception of sensitive microwave communications by covert signal intelligence operations that the Soviets surmised were operating within the embassy. This was the conclu- sion of the IC and was supported by all members save one agency. This particular agency had a vested interest in portraying the MUTS as some form of spy beam, antipersonnel assault or mind control experiment to put pressure on State to force the Soviets to shut down the MUTS operation. When- ever the opportunity arose, this agency campaigned to portray State as an agency that was not serious about security. The infighting, lack of information shar- ing and backstabbing concerning the