The Foreign Service Journal, March 2023

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | MARCH 2023 15 were designed to confront policymakers and intelligence agents with the tough choices they might face as major threats to U.S. interests, those of our allies, and international stability. Our scenarios were not aimed at predicting conflicts and crises, but rather on improving understanding of complex challenges. They allowed participants to test policy options, identify warning signs, and anticipate the reactions of allies and adversaries in a no-fault setting. Our exercises always included a wide range of officials of various levels from all relevant agencies, academic and think-tank experts, and participants from Capitol Hill. Perhaps the most valuable cohort of “outside” participants were for- mer ambassadors and retired military and intelligence leaders. Bloomfield always advised that the depth of experience of FSOs and intelligence officers provided deep talent to “play” the opposing govern- ments in gaming exercises. Concise, substantive memoranda or reports of the exercises were always circulated throughout the State Depart- ment and other agencies, often drawing an encouraging response. Memos sometimes reached the sev- enth floor. The late Colin Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage commented on the exercises on occasion. In a 2003 letter to Mr. Bloomfield, Powell wrote: “We’ve had several exceptional political games at the Foreign Service Institute in the last two years, most notably dealing with the Middle East and the Korean peninsula. Both of these games, as well as others, were enhanced by the strong relation- ship that exists between (Mr.) Hill and our Policy Planning staff.” My final thought is that, with China’s rise, Russia’s aggression, climate change, and the pandemic, the challenges faced by the United States today are even more complex and more serious than in recent decades, and cry out for policy planning exercises. Bringing together a dozen or so individuals who have deep experience in gaming, plus key congressional staff mem- bers to initiate funding support, would be a smart first step toward reestablishment of an office of diplomatic gaming in the department. Exactly how that would be organized, and what actions are then needed, would depend on a senior leader at State—a 21st-century Ron Spiers—who appreciates the need to broaden and deepen insights into current and future challenges that an effective gaming capability can supply to an agile, fully resourced diplomacy. As a general, Dwight D. Eisenhower often cited a soldier’s comment about how the planning process in military, diplo- matic, and most affairs demands thorough exploration of all options and contingen- cies, in essence: “Plans are worthless; planning is everything.” n In a letter dated Sept. 11, 1987, Secretary of State George Shultz thanks Prof. Lincoln Bloomfield for his help in devel- oping “a successful diplomatic simula- tion capability” at State. “I know that simulations are powerful training and analytical devices,” Shultz states. “I am pleased that this device has now been adapted by FSI to strengthen our own policy planning and training functions.” COURTESYOFFREDERICHILL