The Foreign Service Journal, April 2003

tain freedom of movement to Central Asian states that were becoming increasingly con- strained in an environment dominated by Russia and China. Eighteen months later, America is firmly entrenched in Central Asia. It has considerable military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and a ubiquitous mil- itary presence in Afghanistan; it upgraded political and security links with all states in the region save isolated Turkmenistan, and has a relationship amounting to a strategic partnership with Uzbekistan, the most impor- tant regional state. The states hosting U.S. troops are generally happy to see an increased American presence in Central Asia. Some larger neighbors think otherwise, but have neither the intention nor the capacity to dis- lodge the United States from the region. There is no great danger to U.S. troops or citizens in the region comparable to that in the Arab world or even Southeast Asia, and anti-Americanism is arguably less prevalent. This means that in practice, the U.S. is in Central Asia for at least as long as it wants to be. It does not mean that the U.S. will maintain large military bases in Central Asia for decades, or automatically get drawn into regional troubles. But it is clear that the U.S. will remain engaged in the security affairs of Central Asia for the foreseeable future to a larger extent than it was at any time before Sept. 11, 2001, and its policies will concomitantly contribute to deter- mining the future of Central Asia to a considerable extent. This raises the question: What major chal- lenges can the U.S. expect to face while dealing with Central Asia as a region, and the individual Central Asian states, in the coming years? Six major challenges will be dealt with here: the posture that America can expect from regional actors including Russia, China and Iran; the threat of radical Islam in Central Asia; the bur- geoning illegal drugs trade; the challenge of guiding Central Asian states closer to and not far- ther away from open societies and democratic reform; the spe- cial case of Turkmenistan; and the challenge of relaunching regional trade and development. Regional Actors America’s presence in Central Asia may have been welcomed by the local states, but most regional powers were less thrilled. Russian President Vladimir Putin may have voiced no objection publicly, but he spent energies after Sept. 11, 2001, trying to convince Central Asian presidents not to allow the U.S. in. Putin was, however, shrewd enough to understand the futility of the enterprise and abandon it without losing face. China is also, though less acutely, feeling alarmed by American encirclement. The American military presence in Kyrgyzstan — which does not share a border with troubled Afghanistan, the stated reason for the base, but does share a long one with China — is reminis- cent to some Chinese observers of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, during which U.S. troops massed on the borders of the People’s Republic. In apparent reaction, for the first time since 1949, the People’s Liberation Army held exercises on anoth- er state’s territory in 2002. Of the 13 countries that China borders, the exercises were held in Kyrgyzstan. Meanwhile, Russia, also in 2002, opened a military base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, just miles from the American base, in a clear signal that it, too, remains a player in Central Asia. In fact, China and Russia had worked hard to exert a dominant influence over Central Asia, using the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for this purpose. Though local states had a modicum of interest in the establishment of a cooperative umbrella organization for the resolution of disputes in Central Asia, by 2001 the SCO was effectively being used to force the Central Asians to follow Beijing’s and Moscow’s for- eign policy priorities, including so-called “multilater- alism” — shorthand for a world not dominated by America. As local states found no concrete support F O C U S A P R I L 2 0 0 3 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 19 Dr. Svante E. Cornell is the deputy director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, and editor of the Institute’s bi-weekly Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst (www.cacianalyst.org). He also chairs the Caucasus Area Studies Course at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute. It is clear that the U.S. will remain engaged in the security affairs of Central Asia for the foreseeable future.