The Foreign Service Journal, April 2003

Uzbekistan, they also posed security problems for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, through which they transited from their Afghan sanctuary. The initial approach of the Bush administration to the region paralleled that of the Clinton administration: it entailed limited dialogue and assistance, constrained in part by concern over human rights problems and falter- ing democratic reform. Ominously, the Afghanistan- based fundamentalist Islamic insurgency in Central Asia and massive illicit drug flow from Afghanistan through Central Asia to European markets escaped serious atten- tion or action by the Bush administration. The State Department’s annual human rights reports echoed other human rights reporting in candidly charting the deterio- ration of human rights, but the Central Asian govern- ments largely ignored the criticism because there was lit- tle at stake: Early hopes of meaningful U.S. developmen- tal and other assistance had been dashed. Moreover, U.S. business investment, such as in oil and gas development, went forward absent any consideration of burgeoning human rights and democracy faults. Central Asia Moves to Center Stage The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on Sept. 11, 2001, marked a watershed in the U.S. relationship with Central Asia. Within weeks of the tragedy, military basing agree- ments were in place or under negotiation with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and senior U.S. officials had launched intense bilateral dialogues focused on security concerns. In support of the new military arrangements the U.S. hastily revived diplomatic ties, notably in Tajikistan, and proffered new economic and technical assistance programs, many related to security and the movement of illicit drugs. This shift in U.S. perception of the region from a problematic backwater to a zone of critical importance in the war on terrorism prompted an urgent desire to enlist the regimes as “partners” in a global anti-terror coalition. That strategy, however, ran up against the reality of endemic human rights abuse and stunted democratic development that had cast a shadow over U.S. ties to the region for most of the previous decade. Secretary of State Powell acknowledged as much. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Feb. 5, 2002, he noted: “We have a number of new friends, but we’re not unmindful that a number of these new friends — and I will say Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan — do not have the kind of political systems yet that we think are appropriate to the 21st century. And we have no reservation about saying that to them.” That testimony hinted at Bush administration sensitiv- ity to criticism that, as in the Cold War, the U.S. was again aligning itself with authoritarian regimes in service of a global strategy; i.e., a war against global terrorism. Congressman Christopher Smith, R-N.J., a noted propo- nent of human rights and chairperson of the Helsinki Commission, stated in a March 2002 public hearing: “I do think that Americans would be shocked to learn that some of the allies that we’ve embraced in our fight against al-Qaida and worldwide terrorism are at the same time torturers who not only permit but use means for extracting confessions, horrific beatings, coupled with rapes and threats of rape against family members.” He added: “We need zero tolerance for torture, and it seems to me it starts at the highest level with President Bush.” Rep. Smith called on U.S. leaders to speak out against abuse “even if (they) are partners with us in fighting ter- rorism.” In response to concerns that human rights not be sac- rificed for security and geopolitical advantages, the administration developed a two-track approach. Continuing its public criticism of deviance from democ- ratic and human rights norms, the administration also unveiled what was billed as a pro-active approach to human rights and democracy promotion. On June 27, 2002, Lorne Craner, assistant secretary of State for democracy, human rights and labor, told the Senate Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus: “Even while we ramp up our military cooper- ation with governments that have troubling human rights records, we also see this as an opportunity to enhance our engagement and impact on issues of democracy and human rights. … Our firm message to the governments and their leaders has been that [having] closer relations with the United States brings with it a heightened level of scrutiny and that, therefore, any deepening and broaden- ing of our cooperation will depend on continual progress in respecting human rights and democracy.” Craner described “enhanced engagement” as entail- ing closer cooperation in promoting an agenda of demo- cratic reforms and human rights through a variety of ini- tiatives, principally orchestrated through the State Department/USAID apparatus. These included support for media freedom; development of nongovernmental F O C U S A P R I L 2 0 0 3 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 27