The Foreign Service Journal, April 2003

Soviet collapse, pro-Western and pro-American popular attitudes were widespread at the outset of the 1990s, but by the mid-1990s, the tide had shifted. The prosperi- ty that ordinary people expected to accompany independence did not materialize; quite to the contrary, many felt their hopes dashed and sought someone to blame. The usual attitude was that the West’s interest in the region was limited to its energy resources, which it hoped to extract for profit. By all political and economic measures, most Central Asians were worse off after independence than they had been during the Soviet era. As a result, anti-American attitudes were increasingly voiced and frequently animat- ed the behavior of ordinary people on the ground. The American presence was most palpable in the products of U.S. culture. American videos, in particular, made a deep impression on ordinary people, glamorizing all the vices that Muslims were forbidden — especially drinking and sex. We know from public opinion studies conducted in the region that by the mid-1990s, Central Asians were already ill-at-ease with the values that they understood U.S. films to be promoting. It made no dif- ference that the films that made their way to Central Asian pirates were not Hollywood’s best; they were taken to represent American attitudes and American interests. Unease about the United States was, of course, not new to the region. Soviet propaganda had for decades painted the U.S. as driven by economic interests (rather than moral concerns) and willing to use the language of democracy to further these interests. America was paint- ed as a place where the wealthy enjoyed great decadence at the expense of the poor. It does not matter that this propaganda rings hollow to Western ears; what matters is that many of the ways that Central Asians encountered the U.S., its cultural products, or its role in the region, seemed to confirm messages that had bombarded these societies for years. This is not to say that a majority of Central Asians are anti-American. Indications are that they are not. But when grievances (about local economic, social, or political conditions) are plausibly framed with reference to the exercise of U.S. political and cultural influence, political Islam has a powerful ideological fellow traveler. Islamism and Anti-Americanism Meet Rising anti-Americanism makes plausible the sales pitches of radi- cal missionaries. As they recruited new members, the IMU and HT, in particular, tapped anti- American themes. First, they depicted Western models of econ- omy and polity as alien to the region. The nation-state was con- sidered to be a foreign invention that was anti-Islamic at its core. The HT was particu- larly active on this front. Calling for the restoration of the Islamic caliphate, which ended in 1924, it claimed that local conditions required Islamic solidarity based on egalitarianism. To construct an authentically Islamic form of government was to reject the West and its imperialist agenda. (Ironically, in the heart of the Muslim world — the Arab Middle East — the HT faced publics that were skeptical of calls for a caliphate.) The IMU’s literature stressed the need to create an authentically Islamic government within Uzbekistan, describing — always vaguely — the Islamic banking system, political structure, and code of morality that would ensue. After decades of Soviet rule, indigenously Uzbek forms of governance were a distant memory, so these claims to authenticity readily found adherents. As salesmen, the activists were attentive to their audience. HT decrees allowed women to shake hands with men in public, kiss them, and even hold seats in parliament. These were odd concessions from strict Islamists, until one considers their target population. They were attempting to recruit ex-Soviet citizens who had been schooled that women play a prominent pub- lic role in society. The HT’s stress on a rather idyllic form of governance (the caliphate) based on a high- minded principle (egalitarianism) also recalled Soviet- era promises about the “bright future” under commu- nism. Since its social base was relatively well educated (and therefore highly Russified and Sovietized), HT was particularly intent on tapping Soviet-era norms and showed flexibility in doing so. Islamist recruiters sought to depict Islam as inherent- ly peaceful and the U.S. and its allies as inherently war- seeking. The HT, in particular, was a strong advocate of F O C U S 38 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 3 Pro-Western and pro- American popular attitudes were widespread in the vacuum left by the Soviet collapse, but by the mid- 1990s the tide had shifted.