The Foreign Service Journal, April 2003

48 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 3 n the decade between the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Sept. 11, 2001, ter- rorist attacks, U.S. policy toward Central Asia was marked by ambivalence. Central Asia’s remote location, lack of historical or cultural ties to the United States, and its centuries-long domination by other pow- ers, combined to leave the policy commu- nity without easy answers to a host of questions about the region’s strategic signifi- cance for the U.S.: What are U.S. interests in Central Asia? Does the United States care about Central Asia because it is the soft underbelly of China, Russia and Iran? Or is U.S. interest in Central Asia a byproduct of U.S. commit- ment to expand the zone of economic prosperity and democracy worldwide? Or, is the United States simply after Caspian oil and gas resources? The short answer is: all of the above, and more. The post-Sept. 11 military campaign in Afghanistan has transformed Central Asia into the front line in the global war on terrorism. The war on terrorism has given a new and very concrete rationale for U.S. presence in the region: U.S. military presence in Central Asia is required for reasons of operational expediency mandated by the deployment of American forces in Afghanistan. This, in turn means that a set of robust military-to-military relationships with Central Asian militaries is essential. But U.S. involvement cannot stop at that. To counter the appeal of militant Islam to the region’s impoverished population, it is equally important to promote more tolerant regimes, better governance and opportuni- ties for economic development, and to encourage dialogue with moderate Islamic forces. Central Asia’s oil and gas resources can provide it with much-need- ed revenue and other benefits of foreign investment, as well as help bring more energy resources to the global marketplace to the benefit of the United States and all oil-consuming nations. Finally, the map of Central Asia leaves no doubt that it is a tough neighborhood full of former and aspiring hegemons. To guard against them and help Central Asia defend its strategic independence U.S. political and security assistance is essential. Regional Rivals Russia’s retreat from Cen- tral Asia in 1991 left a geopolit- ical vacuum. Many in the Russian national security estab- lishment realized that, but Russia’s weakness and preoccu- pation with domestic crises all through the 1990s had denied Moscow meaningful opportunities for effective intervention. Russian policy toward Central Asia during the decade of the 1990s was full of inconsistencies. The notion that Russia had sacrificed too much for the Soviet Union and for the well-being of the Central Asian republics played a pivotal role in accelerating the USSR’s dissolution. Russia’s political elite want- ed to jettison the country’s Central Asian burden and with it leave behind the unpopular war in Afghanistan and its difficult legacy. But far from leaving its burdensome colonial ties behind in the new era, Russian foreign policy quick- ly focused again on relations with the former colonies, raising the specter of Russian imperialist F O C U S O N C E N T R A L A S I A F ILLING THE V OID : T HE U.S. IN C ENTRAL A SIA S OON AFTER S EPT . 11, 2001, C ENTRAL A SIA BECAME THE FRONT LINE IN THE U.S. WAR ON TERRORISM . T HAT FACT HAS ONLY REINFORCED OUR PRE - EXISTING STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE REGION . B Y E UGENE B. R UMER I