The Foreign Service Journal, April 2003

domination of Central Asia. Moscow claimed a special zone of interest in Central Asia, insisted on the right to intervene in the region to protect the lives of fel- low Russians and sought to con- trol Central Asian export routes, especially for oil. Despite these grand aspira- tions, one thing became increas- ingly clear: Russia was not up to the task of playing the region’s security manager. It had neither the military muscle nor the resources to back up its ambitious claims. Its residual military presence in Central Asia was at least as much a part of the problem as a part of the solution. Mired in alle- gations of drug-trafficking, the Russian military in Tajikistan was clearly not equipped to keep Central Asia stable and defend it against the threat of militant Islam. In short, the Russian presence in Central Asia did little to fill the security vacuum. It would have to be filled by someone else. Surprisingly, however, the United States resisted the temptation to get into a modern-day “great game” in Central Asia. The single most important statement about U.S. policy in the region in the 1990s was made by then-Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the key architect of U.S. policy in the former Soviet Union, in a 1997 speech with a memorable title: “Farewell to Flashman.” The United States, Talbott made clear, rejected the “atavistic” approach of 19th- century colonial powers. The goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia was not to dominate the region, but to make it free of other powers’ domination, thus making it possible for the five Central Asian states to become stable and peaceful. In other words, instead of domi- nating Central Asia, the United States would be satis- fied to see it as a no man’s land. Other regional powers — Russia especially, but also China and Iran — did not take that announce- ment at face value, however. They saw the very fact that the United States was articulating a vision, however limited, for Central Asia as proof of its unprecedented ambition. Moscow feared the specter of geopolitical encirclement between an ever- expanding NATO to its west and a growing American presence to its south and east. China had to wonder whether the U.S. move was intended as a geopolitical pressure point to leverage the U.S. rela- tionship with Taiwan. And Iran viewed with alarm the simultaneous expansion of U.S. influence in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. A Geopolitical Free-for-All Accordingly, all three powers moved to shift the geopolitical balance in their favor, but failed to do so. None had the resources needed to dominate the region on its own, yet suspicion of each others’ motives prevented them from allying. For example, both Russia and China feared Iran as a supporter of militant Islam. Yet Russia feared Chinese dominance, while China didn’t trust Russia to keep the region sta- ble as it had already let go of it. Most of all, none of the five Central Asian states was content with the prospect of either Russia, China or Iran playing the role of the region’s hegemon. Good relations with all three were important, but none of the three was to be trusted. Each had ulteri- or motives for building ties to the region, which Central Asia would be expected to reciprocate by granting access to its resources, or by compromising its strategic independence. The United States, by virtue of geographic dis- tance, lack of geopolitical ambition in Central Asia and its stated preference to see all other would-be hegemons stay out, was the best possible partner for Central Asia. However, good relations with Washington had their price, too. Absent a geopoliti- cal stake in Central Asia, the U.S. interest was not in staying there, but in getting out as soon as the newly independent nations were strong enough to stand on their own. And the best way to achieve that, from the American perspective, was through economic and F O C U S A P R I L 2 0 0 3 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 49 Dr. Eugene B. Rumer is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. Despite grand aspirations, Russia was not up to the task of being the region’s security manager.