The Foreign Service Journal, April 2003

term and will require long- term solutions. This will require U.S. involvement there, which will most likely be measured in decades, not years. Given Central Asia’s cur- rent condition, it is only realis- tic to expect its regimes to entail some form of authori- tarian rule for the foreseeable future. This means that Washington will have to accept and deal with Central Asia as it is, not as the United States would like it to be. Staying engaged in Central Asia will require the U.S. to balance its commitment to promote freedom and democracy against operational expediency. The nature of the trade-offs is likely to vary depending on the specific conditions in each of the region’s five countries. Accepting Central Asia as it is also means paying closer attention to its cultural and historical roots. The absence of democratic traditions in itself is not reason enough to give up on the region’s democratic prospects. However, Central Asia’s legacy, coupled with the absence of grass-roots pressures for political liberalization, suggests that U.S. energies may be bet- ter focused for the foreseeable future on moderating the excesses of the Central Asian regimes. A short, but meaningful list of improvements would include: curbing corruption, police brutality and torture; allowing a degree of self-expression for the population; tolerating a moderate version of Islam; and permitting development of economic activity and trade. Ideally, Central Asian regimes with these attributes should also be able to provide for their own stability and security with limited assistance from the United States. A Strong Military Component Given the prominence of security concerns on the U.S. agenda in Central Asia, U.S. involvement in the region will undoubtedly have a strong military com- ponent. Forging a robust military-to-military rela- tionship in support of U.S. short- and medium-term objectives, as dictated by ongoing operational require- ments, will be essential. In general, U.S. military-to- military assistance can help regional stability by promoting the U.S. model of civil-military relations and assisting Central Asian militaries to establish themselves as professional mili- tary organizations. The mili- taries’ marginal role at present in Central Asian domestic poli- tics and the lack of military tra- ditions present the United States with an opportunity to shape the development of the region’s military institu- tions. In this context, the experience of U.S. involve- ment with military institutions elsewhere — in Europe, Asia and Latin America — can be a source of useful lessons. Lastly, the U.S. military presence in Central Asia is likely to be the most visible element of its engage- ment there. From Washington’s perspective, America’s presence may be relatively insignificant and pale in comparison with its military deployments in other regions. However, from the standpoint of Central Asia’s rulers and the leaders of other powers — Russia, China, etc. — the U.S. presence has to be reckoned with. Their perceptions of the U.S. mili- tary role will probably be a function of the overall quality of their relations with the United States. Nonetheless, a reverse dynamic is also possible, with their perceptions of the U.S. posture in Central Asia defining their assessments of their relationships with the United States in general. Thus, it will be important for Washington to maintain a healthy degree of transparency about its intentions in Central Asia, albeit not at the price of implicitly accepting other powers’ droit de regard over the region. As the United States pursues these objectives in Central Asia, it is important not to inflate expectations among congressional and private sector audiences in the United States. Two or three years’ worth of slow- er-than-expected progress, or no progress at all, could produce a backlash in the United States against Central Asia and U.S. policy there. Reminding all parties involved that long-term problems require long-term solutions is an essential element, albeit not a guarantee, of long-term success. F O C U S A P R I L 2 0 0 3 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 51 By the end of the 1990s, Central Asia was seen not as an opportunity for U.S. policy, but as a strategic quagmire.