The Foreign Service Journal, April 2004

Some of the problems are: Lack of Understanding of the Nature of Public Diplomacy Unlike State, the U.S. military sepa- rates public affairs from psychological operations because it recognizes that the two elements can be incompatible or even contradictory. “Public affairs” principally deals with the media and is essentially reactive , responding to an event or news story with the govern- ment’s story to pre-empt the media. The PA function’s timeline is usually measured in a fewminutes to a fewdays. “Public diplomacy,” like peacetime psychological operations, is pro-active . It deals with the whole spectrum of society, seeking to change attitudes and persuade the target audience. The PD timeline can be anything from a few hours to several decades. Our public affairs officers abroad are faced with mounting pressures from embassy front offices to devote their energies to public affairs at the expense of public diplomacy. In order to ensure that long-range public diplomacy goals are not overlooked, public diplomacy offi- cers should report to and be rated by the chief of mission or DCM and by their regional public diplomacy super- visors in Washington. Lack of True Integration in the State Department If public diplomacy is ever to be at the heart of the foreign policy process, it must reside there. One cannot “call in” the public diplomacy team when needed. Rather, public diplomacy officers must be among those who would be doing the “calling in.” In other words, the senior leadership of the real power centers of the Depart- ment of State — the regional bureaus — should include senior public diplo- macy officers, at least at the deputy assistant secretary level. But the reality in today’s State Department is that senior PD officers are, for the most part, restricted to the two ex-USIA bureaus, International Information Programs and Education- al & Cultural Affairs. Indeed, since the reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies in October 1999, there have been only two public diplomacy officers assigned at the DAS level within any regional bureau (both in the same bureau, within the past few months). If such exclusion were based on race, gender or ethnicity, rather than functional specialization, it would surely have evoked such an outcry that corrective action would have been taken immediately. In the absence of sufficient numbers of senior public diplomacy officers in the regional bureaus’ front offices, a more practical solution for the long term would be to remove the PD offi- cers from the regional bureaus (leaving the public affairs functions behind) and reassemble them in a new Bureau of Public Diplomacy Operations under the aegis of the under secretary for pub- lic diplomacy and public affairs. Lack of Central Authority over Public Diplomacy Operations The single most serious flaw in the 1999 reorganization plan was the inclusion of the regional USIA offices as public diplomacy offices within the regional bureaus of the department. This meant that the PD office director and the PD staff were under the direct supervision of one of the deputy assis- tant secretaries and, ultimately, under the assistant secretary in the regional bureau. In the State Department, the regional bureaus call the shots. No amount of “interaction” with the under secretary for PD and PA or with other PD bureaus can alter this fact. As a result, the PD office director’s career is in the hands of those who may not well understand how PD works or who may have agendas that are inconsistent with what PD needs to accomplish. Making matters worse, there are now at least six different public diplo- macies (one for each region) rather than unity of command and a coher- ent and single public diplomacy, which is then adapted to local conditions as needed. The under secretary for pub- lic diplomacy and public affairs has full responsibility for the conduct of pub- lic diplomacy worldwide but lacks real authority over it. As we have seen, this is a recipe for failure. State’s response to the Djeridjian Report acknowledged that public diplomacy must have a central policy and resource focus under the control of the under secretary. Exactly how much control will likely be an issue for prolonged negotiations. But the cre- ation of a Bureau for Public Diplo- macy Operations to coordinate, direct and be responsive to PD field posts would ensure that authority—not just responsibility — would be in the hands of the under secretary. Lack of Adequate Funding for Public Diplomacy Programs So far the war on terrorism has brought some modest additional resources to public diplomacy. But these funds, while welcome and already being put to good use, barely 16 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 4 S P E A K I N G O U T America’s current “image problem” must be addressed not just in a single region, but with a planned approach to the whole field of public diplomacy.