The Foreign Service Journal, April 2004

age, ensuring that FSN job descrip- tions and ranks are contained in one database that is immediately com- puter-accessible instead of in paper files that are sometimes inconsistent and contradictory, and in any case difficult to track and to manage. If one accepts this rationale at face value, one can dismiss the shudder of nervousness passing through FSN ranks as merely a pre- dictable resistance to change. Still, one does not have to be a cynic to understand the fear that the CAJE system is an elaborate scheme designed to lower the average rank of FSNs, thereby saving Uncle Sam money in the mid- to long term. Granted, it was decided from the start that should CAJE reclassification cause an FSN position’s rank to fall, then the individual occupying that position will retain the pay attached to his or her previous, higher ranking. Conversely, if the position’s rank increases with CAJE, the individual will gain that benefit. By all appearances, it is a no-lose situation. But is it that sim- ple? During my previous and present assignments I have worked closely, if only in intensive bursts, on CAJE issues affecting several FSN colleagues. This has included helping shape one political FSN position that did not exist before. This “user’s” perspective has given me reason to question the wisdom of the system, particularly its potential impact on the FSN group whose special value and contributions I highlighted above. There are three interrelated dimensions to my con- cern, each pointing (in my view) to the narrow “admin- driven” nature of the reform. First, the CAJE calculus implicitly assigns more value to the work done by FSNs in the admin/GSO fields — thereby discriminat- ing against the rest. Second, unlike the personnel sys- tem for the rest of the Foreign Service, CAJE assigns rank to the position, not the person — lending disproportionate weight to the bureaucratic qualification at the expense of personal quality. (This, of course, closely parallels the U.S. Civil Service employment structure.) Third and perhaps most crucial- ly, CAJE fails to recognize or assign value to some of the most impor- tant characteristics of superior “substantive” FSNs — precisely because these characteristics are difficult to quantify and impossible to squeeze into one of CAJE’s discrete boxes. Measuring Charm The CAJE formula assigns value to an FSN position by assessing its relative requirements in the broad cat- egories of, successively, responsibility, knowledge, intellectual skills, communication, and environment. On the face of it these categories seem neutral enough. But the system’s marked tilt toward — along with the easier measurability of — GSO/admin-type responsi- bilities emerges on closer examination. Take a quick look at an instruction sheet listing examples for the kinds of tasks that count for something in each of those categories and you will note that they are weighted toward those who work with or manage resources and equipment — visa foils or machinery or cash. Again, these management-type tasks and responsibilities are crucial, and arguably as important as any other. (FS generalists seeking promotion understand full well how important they are.) But even the three categories that would appear to apply to the primary responsibilities of “substantive” FSNs — knowledge, communication and intellectual skills — don’t quite make the cut. Sifting through illus- trative examples of hypothetical tasks in these cate- gories that matter to the wizards who assess the posi- tion’s rank, one senses that the contributions of key political, economic and public affairs FSNs were after- thoughts in the overall scheme — as though the sys- tem’s designers realized they had to throw the few remaining folks a bone. For example, under the cate- gory of intellectual skills, which, among other things, measures the extent to which the job requires “plan- F O C U S 30 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 4 Alexis Ludwig has been in the Foreign Service for 10 years. He has served as a consular officer in Guatemala, a political-military officer in Tokyo, Indonesia desk offi- cer in the department and a political officer in Kuala Lumpur. He is currently deputy economic-political sec- tion chief and labor officer in La Paz. Do we truly recognize and reward all FSNs’ contributions to the success of our diplomatic missions?