The Foreign Service Journal, April 2005

tic revenues. Governments don’t want to go after the rich.” Significant assistance could weaken accountabili- ty as governments feel less need to respond to their citizens. In Oidov’s view, the MCA evalua- tion process would be an important avenue for pressure on governments, in addition to the eligibility criteria. “We must have an avenue of account- ability. To date, accountability on pro- jects has been hard to get,” she states. Oidov cited a World Bank project where a women’s group and other NGOs were frozen out of the consul- tative process by a government wor- ried they might discover corruption. Civil society groups in Mongolia, she believes, have learned how to work with people. It is important to strengthen this capacity, to build in a channel of influence in the MCA for civil society groups that is real and not just window dressing. Bolivia. The fact that “country ownership” is built into the MCA process is not only meant to increase the effectiveness of the program but to underscore that this assistance is insulated from U.S. geostrategic con- siderations, the business of rewarding friends and punishing foes. In the case of Bolivia, an MCA-eligible country, this would represent a wel- come change from traditional Ameri- can assistance policy, in the view of many. Ronald MacLean-Abaroa, a former Bolivian presidential candi- date, recently told an audience of development experts that eradicating drugs had been the sole target of U.S. assistance. When Bolivia eradicated drugs, GDP promptly fell 10 percent, and the resulting riots drove the pres- ident from office. The net effect was a backslide in democracy and eco- nomic growth, as well as the ouster of local U.S. allies. For all these reasons, Bolivia, he says, “should be the per- fect MCA country.” Vietnam. Experts had predicted that Vietnam would be in the first group of eligible countries based on its scores against the indicators. Vo Van Ai and Penelope Faulkner, presi- dent and vice president, respectively, of Que Me (Action for Democracy in Vietnam), were strongly supportive of putting democracy conditions on assistance. They were astonished that Vietnam could be eligible, especially given the MCA’s special emphasis on anti-corruption. “People who expose corruption are in jail. Vietnam is a closed society,” they say. “A ‘cyber- dissident’ was sentenced to 13 years for downloading and translating an article on ‘what is democracy?’ from the U.S. embassy Web site. Even after protests were made, he still got five years.” According to Van Ai and Faulkner, Vietnam is skilled in attracting inter- national assistance, making human rights gestures only when necessary: “Religious leaders are in jail. Prior to the arrival of a World Bank delegation last November to discuss assistance, one prominent leader was released and met with the World Bank. Immediately after a large loan was agreed on the religious leader was put back in jail. Unfortunately, the inter- national financial community appears to be only interested in stability.” Steve Radelet, author of many books and articles on the MCA, observes that it is interesting that Vietnam, Bhutan and Mauritania were knocked out, even though they qualified on the numbers. It may indicate, according to Radelet, that in practice, the MCC board will use a democracy threshold for eligibility, without being open and transparent about it. However, the inclusion of Armenia and Morocco in the MCA list raises questions about that assumption. Problems and Recommendations The MCA has just been launched, but it is a promising new approach to assistance. Whether that promise will be realized will depend in large part on how effective the MCA is in vitalizing democratic processes and engaging publics. Because the MCA has political indicators that include core democratic institutions and because it is such a significant expan- sion of U.S. assistance, it is fair to ask how it will offer incentives and exert pressure for democratization. The short answer is that it is much too soon to tell. Clearly, the MCA opens the door to a debate on democracy and governance conditionality for aid. Nongovernmental organizations in developing countries need to walk through that door. At the same time, it is reasonable to predict that given the ambiguities in the eligibility standards, the MCA is likely to fall short of its potential unless the MCC fine-tunes the implementation and adjusts the emphasis. Accepting sustainable development as a top priority means also accepting that the elements of democracy (transparency, account- ability, participation and legitimacy and fundamental freedoms) are at the heart of what will make the pro- gram work. Whatever the constraints on other sources of assistance, such as the World Bank, there is no good reason for the United States to be 34 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 5 In theory, even if democracy is not an explicit condition, the MCA will contribute to democratization in four ways.