The Foreign Service Journal, April 2005

equivocal about democracy condi- tionality and support for democrati- zation. Among the ways to tighten up the incentives and pressure for democratic development are the fol- lowing: Strengthen “ruling justly” democracy indicators. The fact that in addition to Vietnam, Bhutan and Mauritania, other non-democra- cies meet the statistical require- ments for MCA eligibility should be a signal that democracy conditional- ity needs to be toughened up, or it might disappear — and with it any MCA claim to be a “new approach.” A coalition of groups from the democracy, human rights and devel- opment communities, headed by Freedom House, signed a letter to Pres. Bush in 2002 urging him to include specific human rights and democracy criteria in the “ruling justly” category. (While the adminis- tration did not respond to the letter, Freedom House indicators, as noted, are used for two indicators in the “Ruling Justly” category.) The letter stated that when fundamental free- doms such as the freedom of expres- sion and association and the rights to free and fair elections and equal treatment under the law are in place, “adherence to the rule of law and anti-corruption efforts are more likely to follow.” In other words, the coalition urged, put democracy first. This can be accomplished in sev- eral ways. Democratic elections could be made a separate indicator, and eligible countries required to score above the median of compet- ing countries, as is the case with the corruption indicator. Another approach would be to require that eligible countries be rated as “elec- toral democracies” by Freedom House. “Electoral democracies” have met minimum democracy stan- dards, including on the conduct of elections. Of the 17 current MCA- eligible countries, two, Armenia and Morocco, fail to score as electoral democracies. An absolute score on political rights of a “3” or better in Freedom House ratings rather than a median score could be required: a “3” score from Freedom House almost always means elections have met international standards. At the very least, the MCC board should be required to state the spe- cial factors that justified including a country that did not score at or above the median in political rights. Further, the MCC should rename the political category “ruling justly,” using instead the term from the leg- islation, “just and democratic gover- nance.” With its top-down connota- tions, the former is ill-suited to sug- gest democratization criteria. Emphasize transparency and public participation. The MCA requires countries to describe the consultative processes undertaken with civil society and the private sec- tor in developing development pri- orities and implementing grants. However, it is not clear the extent to which openness, transparency and public input will be required in the evaluation stage. Ensuring the effective dissemination in MCA countries of information about the project development, implementa- tion and evaluation stages is crucial in legitimizing programs. In the view of Ghana’s Gyimah-Boadi, any effective process must be as inclu- sive as possible, bringing in all sec- tors. Inclusiveness works, even for anti-corruption laws. Governments must reach out and negotiate with the private sector. Negotiation, not top-down “consultation,” is the key to success. Increase democracy and gov- ernance funding in USAID. Democracy and human rights experts are concerned that the MCA is drying up sources of funding for direct democracy programs, without being itself, in either theory or prac- tice, a democracy program. Special funds will be available in high-pro- file targets — above all, Iraq — to fund political party development and election monitor training, as well as a panoply of other democra- cy and governance areas. But other countries, at all stages of democratic development, will be left out. Some — El Salvador is often mentioned — need only a limited amount of sus- tained attention, but need it never- theless. Avoid using MCA for other objectives; keep it insulated from special U.S. interests. The MCA program will lose value — and effec- tiveness — to the extent that publics in recipient countries identify it not with development goals but with U.S. foreign policy. Under the authorizing legislation, an MCA pro- gram can be terminated or suspend- ed if “the country or entity is engaged in activities which are con- trary to the national security inter- ests of the United States.” It is well to remember the pressure that the U.S. is putting on countries to sign bilateral agreements not to surren- der American citizens to the International Criminal Court. If the MCA is used for that type of lever- aging, it will not be seen as a new approach to assistance but as a very old one, and likely to suffer from old failures. ■ A P R I L 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 35 The fact that “country ownership” is built into the MCA process is meant to increase its effectiveness.