The Foreign Service Journal, April 2005

A P R I L 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 45 results in increasingly more challeng- ing implementing environments — e.g., post-conflict stabilization and political transition. Thus, there is a strong case to be made for increased specialization to tailor programs and their funding sources to particular pol- icy parameters and statutory require- ments. A January 2004 USAID white paper ( U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century ) began this process, articulating how the gov- ernment could improve the way it allo- cates various sources of foreign assis- tance to match program objectives more accurately and consistently. However, a clearly articulated over- all foreign policy vision and analytical- ly sound rationale should drive this process, not just the general desire to rationalize resource allocation (howev- er useful that may be as a tactic in sup- port of revamping foreign policy at the operational level). What the U.S. cannot afford to do is to undertake another piecemeal reform process that avoids the difficult work of addressing institutional fail- ures such as ineffective (and some- times counterproductive) congres- sional oversight, a dysfunctional pro- curement process, and bureaucratic turf wars that undermine the effec- tiveness of programs and the credibil- ity of policy. In creating the MCC, however, the Bush administration opted for avoid- ance. It should not be too surprising that the desire for flexibility in inter- preting country performance against the 16 indicators undercuts claims that the process is strictly apolitical and evi- dence-based. The notion of any orga- nization, governmental or quasi-inde- pendent, using U.S. government funds apolitically is preposterous. The MCC, like all of the foreign affairs organizations, is certainly political. The bottom line is that its backers no longer want to work with or through USAID, but they are unwilling to undertake the difficult work of revamping that agency as part of a larger, more formidable effort to refor- mulate U.S. foreign policy. Unfortunately, in choosing not to address institutional failure within the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, the Bush administration makes the MCA’s own failure more likely. Sooner or later the MCC will find itself con- fronted with the same obstacles that have hobbled foreign assistance his- torically. Congress will eventually rouse itself and demand greater over- sight and micro-management. Other government agencies will find ways to muscle in and expropriate funds and functions from the MCC. If it responds like most bureaucracies, cir- cling its wagons to protect and defend itself rather than reaching for substan- tive reform, U.S. foreign assistance will be right back in the same old rut. The MCC will neither have helped the U.S. government achieve its for- eign policy objectives nor reduced the global community’s growing distrust of America’s “real” intentions. It is not too late to head off this cycle of cynicism. As the MCC ramps up with staffing, operations and dis- bursements to recipient countries, Congress might do well to stop its Johnny-one-note approach to foreign assistance oversight — namely, con- trolling appropriation levels. Instead, it should work actively with the exec- utive branch to overhaul U.S. foreign assistance, keeping what has worked and discarding the rest. In so doing, Congress should attempt to strike a balance between accountability and flexibility. As a show of good-faith commitment on its part, the MCC should begin to reach out immediately to the appropriate committees and subcommittees in Congress to come to mutual agree- ment on the design of a rigorous accountability system, one that is based on best practices from 50-plus years of foreign assistance. In addition, Congress and the administration should make a greater effort to make more explicit the link- ages between ongoing USAID devel- opment assistance programs and those to be developed through the MCA, especially given the volume of resources to be disbursed through the latter. As currently planned, the MCA will disburse $3 billion in FY 2006, an amount equal to what is currently spent for all USAID-managed pro- grams worldwide. The MCC should follow the State Department and USAID’s examples by committing itself to policy and program coordina- tion with these two organizations and others in the government that finance and administer overseas development programs. Finally, as has been suggested by development policy experts, the administration should tie all of its for- eign policy “carrots” to political transi- tion “sticks.” Measurable progress in a country’s political transition should be required not only for foreign assis- tance and MCA eligibility, but also to maintain and strengthen strategic and commercial ties and assistance. Admittedly, such a shift may draw a strong negative reaction from coun- tries sensitive to the United States imposing its values. Still, recent experience has shown that coupling multiple policy objec- tives, if done in a balanced and analyt- ical fashion — the North American Free Trade Agreement, which includ- ed environmental provisions and a labor sidebar agreement, is a good example — has the potential to rein- force virtuous circles of improved development outcomes, progress in political reform and improved quali- ty of life for recipient-country citi- zens. The establishment of the MCA represents a good first step in this direction. If the challenges it pre- sents are acknowledged, and dealt with honestly and boldly, it may be a decisive step. ■