THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | APRIL-MAY 2025 37 Legacy War Issues and Beyond My predecessors had labored diligently on war legacy issues, including the search for MIAs. My Washington colleagues and I added a new task: removing the now outdated arms embargo on Vietnam. This would generate increased bilateral trust, build a closer military-to-military relationship, and help open a market for American military sales. I worked closely with my Washington counterparts to partially lift the embargo in late 2014, which we fully ended in 2016 while I was assistant secretary of Defense. Building trust also required closer relations between the embassy and Vietnamese Communist Party headquarters. After all, the party ran the country, made all the important foreign policy decisions, and managed Vietnam’s day-to-day relations with China. Political Counselor Mark Lambert developed a useful relationship with the party’s Foreign Affairs Department. We sent party officials on International Visitor programs and briefed party officials generally on our approach to major developments in the region. Senior Vietnamese officials later informed me that this effort contributed directly to the decision to send then–Party General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng to the U.S. in 2015. Before departing for post, I was instructed to persuade the Vietnamese to join negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement. That both countries would benefit from the TPP economically was obvious. It was also obvious that U.S. regional economic policy could bolster our geopolitical strategy not only by building Vietnam’s economic base but also by diversifying its international economic options. The TPP would make it easier for Vietnam to avoid having to accommodate themselves completely to Beijing’s economic interests. It would also offer more opportunities for American firms looking to invest outside China. Our Economic Counselor Laura Stone made these points to our Vietnamese and American counterparts at every opportunity and smoothed the way for the U.S. Trade Representative’s talks with the Vietnamese. They joined the TPP negotiations in 2013. On my 2011 introductory calls in Hanoi, I had told my hosts that both sides wanted Vietnamese TPP membership but that we had a problem: Congress would be less likely to support Vietnam’s
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