38 APRIL-MAY 2025 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL participation in the agreement without demonstrable progress on human rights. Vietnam should not only agree to strong labor provisions within the TPP text itself but also show progress in other areas. My Vietnamese colleagues understood this and agreed to embark on an effort to explore with our embassy realistic steps the government could take. We decided on a list that included, inter alia, Vietnam’s accession to the United Nations Convention Against Torture, registration of more unofficial house churches, and the release of political prisoners. By the time I left post, the Vietnamese had shown improvements in all these areas. (Our geopolitical and geoeconomic strategies diverged, and much of our leverage on human and labor rights evaporated with our departure from TPP in 2017, to my great disappointment and to the utter chagrin of our Vietnamese partners.) Security Cooperation My able predecessor, Mike Michalak, had initiated negotiations on a military-to-military agreement during his tenure. In September 2011, a month after my arrival at post, the two sides concluded a Memorandum of Understanding on Advancing Bilateral Security Cooperation under which both sides pledged to upgrade collaboration in maritime security, military medicine, UN peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and exchanges between our defense universities. We increased naval ship visits to Vietnam, including to Cam Ranh Bay, and intensified bilateral defense policy exchanges. We also added a civilian capacity building component to Vietnam’s maritime security program by agreeing to transfer six fast patrol boats to Vietnam’s Coast Guard. This was the precursor of the 2015 Maritime Security Initiative, a five-year, $450 million program designed to build capacity throughout the region that the Congress authorized during my tenure as assistant secretary of Defense. “When the Chinese know the United States is engaged in the region, they treat us better,” a senior Vietnamese official once told me. During my tenure, the Vietnamese hosted visits by Secretaries of State Clinton and Kerry, the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, Commerce, Health and Human Services, the Environmental Protection Agency administrator, and the Pacific commander, among others. My mission also worked hard to bolster congressional support for an activist policy on Vietnam. Senators McCain (R-Ariz.), Leahy (D-Vt.), Carden (D-Md.), Corker (R-Tenn.), Whitehouse (D-R.I.), Ayotte (R-N.H.), and Lieberman (D-Conn.) and multiple congressmen visited Hanoi. As one might expect, Senator McCain was particularly supportive of our effort to take the relationship in a geopolitical direction. Increased exchanges like these paved the way for a successful 2013 visit to the U.S. by President Trương Tấn Sang, during which we announced the launch of a comprehensive partnership. The Chinese provided the drama that marked the end of my already eventful tour. In early May 2014, the state-owned Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) moved an oil rig into disputed waters south of the Paracel Islands. This action sparked a stand-off between the two sides’ coast guard vessels, multiple sharply worded responses from Hanoi, and anti-Chinese rioting across Vietnam. Long-standing U.S. policy on territorial disputes prevented us from supporting the Vietnamese claim, but we did make our displeasure with the Chinese known and used the event to strengthen our ties to Vietnam’s national security community, particularly its coast guard. The Chinese action drew strong negative reactions throughout the region, and CNOOC withdrew the rig a month ahead of schedule, a modest victory for those opposed to Chinese adventurism in the South China Sea. Any gains for U.S. interests in Vietnam during my tenure were the result of a team effort, also led by Deputy Chief of Mission Claire Pierangelo. A strong, collegial country team allowed us to use all the tools of statecraft in a systematic way. I tried to ensure that my team had everything it needed to do what American diplomats do best, which is to discover opportunities to advance U.S. interests and exploit them. n Ambassador David Shear (fourth from right) accompanies an MIA recovery mission to Son La, northwest Vietnam, in July 2013. Ambassador David Shear (second from left) with (from left) Dr. Le Ke Son and Hill staffer Tim Rieser, both active in Agent Orange remediation, Michael DiGregorio from the Asia Foundation, and Charles Bailey from the Aspen Institute during Senator Patrick Leahy’s visit to Vietnam in April 2014. COURTESY OF DAVID SHEAR COURTESY OF DAVID SHEAR
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