The Foreign Service Journal, April 2006

priate by the government removed. Foreign companies who want to oper- ate in China are required to comply with this policy. (See the Open Net Initiative ’s detailed case study on China at http://www.opennetinitia tive.net/studies/china/ .) The news that Google had agreed to such terms set off a volley of criti- cism in the U.S. The company de- fended the decision in an official statement: “Our continued engage- ment with China is the best (and per- haps only) way for Google to help bring the tremendous benefits of uni- versal access to all our users there.” To the PRC’s irritation, google.cn informs users when results have been blocked. In addition, Chinese surf- ers can still access the uncensored Chinese-language version of the U.S.- based google.com. Google is not the only American company to stay engaged in China — a country that is second only to the U.S. in Internet use, with 130 million users. Yahoo!, for example, reported- ly identified users who sent anti-gov- ernment e-mails, resulting in several arrests. Microsoft recently removed a blog from its MSN Spaces at the request of the Chinese government. The issue has struck a chord in the Bush administration. On Feb. 14, Secretary of State Rice established the Global Internet Freedom Task Force “to ensure a robust policy response to the challenges” ( www.state.gov/r/ pa/prs/ps/2006/61156.htm ). In a back-and-forth with reporters on the occasion, Under Secretary for Econo- mic, Business and Agricultural Affairs Josette Shiner and Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky explained that GIFT would work with companies, NGOs and governments to address concerns on all aspects of Internet freedom ( www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/ rm/2006/61182.htm ). — Susan Maitra and Shawn Guan, Editorial Intern Tehran’s Nuclear Aspirations: Not a Zero-Sum Game The Iranian nuclear issue returned to the forefront of global concern with the decision of the International Atomic Energy Agency on Feb. 4 to report its findings regarding Iran to the United Nations Security Council, for use in determining possible sanc- tions ( http://www.iaea.org ) . Iran’s nuclear program has a long history, from the 1960s, when the United States provided a small re- search reactor to the shah’s govern- ment. The program was delayed by the onset of the Iranian Revolution, which cut off the flow of information and technology from Europe and the U.S. Development was then further hindered by the outbreak of the Iran- Iraq War. The project moved forward in 1995 when the Russians agreed to provide assistance in completing the construction of the Bushehr power reactor. But it was only in 2002, with the discovery of two previously undis- closed nuclear-related facilities at Natanz and Arak, that global attention was again drawn to Iran. Before this exposure, Iran’s activi- ties appeared to have been in compli- ance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which it is a party. However, the revelation of secret nuclear facili- ties led many countries to question the motivations behind Iran’s nuc- lear research, and to question whether Iran might be in breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty ( http:// www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/ ). Iranian obstacles to the work of IAEA inspectors only worsened the situa- tion. Tehran argues that it requires nuclear power to accommodate its growing population and to free up oil for export, but the U.S. argues that Iran has enough oil reserves to pro- vide adequate energy (testimony at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/212 47.htm , accompanying media at http://www.state.gov/t/us/21782. htm ). The U.S. and some European nations are wary of potential Iranian nuclear-weapons capacity, especially in the light of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s aggressive October 2005 statements regarding Israel, which were immediately condemned. Another reason for concern is that such weapons could potentially fall into the hands of terrorist groups. Various approaches to the resolu- tion of this issue are advocated by think-tanks, most emphasizing the use of military force only in the case of an A P R I L 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 13 50 Years Ago... There is a widespread and unjustified belief that many Foreign Service officers, cowed by certain security practices, conceal their opinion or pull their punches or write in veiled language. — Martin F. Herz, in “Some Problems of Political Reporting,” FSJ, April 1956. C Y B E R N O T E S u