The Foreign Service Journal, April 2006

absolute exhaustion of diplomatic and economic options. Since the 1981 Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear facility in Osirak, the military option has held an attraction for some, such as the Hudson Institute’s Herbert I. London, who claims military force is “the most likely strategem for success” ( http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm ?fuseaction=publication_details& id=3888 ). Yet the Oxford Research Group recently estimated that U.S. military action against Iran could kill thou- sands of civilians, trigger more terror- ist attacks in the region (potentially targeting oil-processing facilities), and drive Iran to carry out its nuclear development program with greater urgency, secrecy and determination ( http://www.oxfordresearchgroup . org.uk/publications/briefings/Iran Consequences.pdf ). Most groups advocate economic deterrence. An example of a sanc- tions-based solution is the approach recommended by Michael O’Hanlon and David Sandalow of the Brookings Institution ( http://www.Brook.edu/ views/op-ed/fellows/20060131. htm ). It would be prudent for the world community to develop an alter- native energy source so sanctions tar- geting Iran’s most lucrative export (oil) become economically and physi- cally viable, they say. In addition, independence from oil imports would mitigate the effect of instability in the Middle East. Furthermore, a military strike, they argue, “could help en- trench a radical regime in power and might only delay an Iranian bomb,” a sentiment echoed by Judith Yaphe and Charles Lutes of the National Defense University in a recent study ( http://www.ndu.edu/inss/mcnair/ mcnair69/McNairPDF.pdf ). In testimony on Feb. 1 before the House Armed Services Committee, George Perkovich, vice president of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter- national Peace, highlighted potential problems with sanctions targeting oil exports ( http://www.carnegieen dowment.org/publications/index. cfm?fa=view&id=17967&prog= zgp&proj=znpp,zusr ). He instead advocated cutting off foreign invest- ment and food imports into Iran. While neither of these is as large a part of the Iranian economy as oil exports, Iran still needs both of them to survive. Also, cutting off those channels would have minimal impact on the global economy. He also dis- agrees with pre-emptive military intervention, citing a lack of adequate intelligence and the unpredictable outcome. For more information on the topic, the IAEA’s focus section on Iran ( http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/ Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml ) con- tains interviews, statements and back- ground information from the agency, in addition to outside news links. The U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute has published a com- prehensive analysis dealing with the consequences of a nuclear-ready Iran ( http://www.strategicstudiesinst itute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB629. pdf. n — Shawn Guan, Editorial Intern C Y B E R N O T E S u 14 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 6 Site of the Month: www.opennetinitiative.net Ever wonder what a censored Internet looks like? Check out the OpenNet Initiative Web site: among other things, it features a tool that lets you compare searches for sensitive keywords on Google’s censored Chinese search engine, google.cn , with results from google.com. The OpenNet Initiative is a joint project of the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto’s Munk Centre for International Studies, Harvard Law School’s Berkman Center for Internet & Society and the Advanced Network Research Group at the University of Cambridge Cambridge Security Program. These three leading academic institutions have partnered to train their concerted attention on the problems of maintaining the Internet as a medium of free and open communication. The group’s stated aim is to excavate, expose and analyze filtering and sur- veillance practices in a credible and nonpartisan fashion: “We intend to uncov- er the potential pitfalls and unintended consequences of these practices, and thus help to inform better public policy and advocacy work in this area.” Though filtering and surveillance occur mostly in non-democratic regimes, many democratic countries, led by the U.S., also seek to police the Internet and curb its perceived lawlessness, ONI says. ONI relies on a combination of sophisticated network interrogation tools and metrics and a global network of regionally-based researchers and experts to conduct research, which is then posted at the Web site in the form of nation- al and regional case studies, occasional papers and bulletins. The group also operates a clearinghouse for circumvention technologies, both assessing what is on the market and developing technologies in-house, and explores the legal and political implications of future surveillance and filtering trends. — Susan Maitra