The Foreign Service Journal, April 2006

mote peace talks with guerrillas and the AUC. But Uribe sensed that the country had changed, and was ready to take a hard line against vio- lent groups. Seeing his opening, he took it, winning by a healthy margin in 2002. To Washington’s applause, Uribe quickly labeled his approach “democratic security,” meaning all citizens have a right to be free from violence — and a duty to help make their communities safer. He levied new taxes on the rich to pay for a stronger armed forces and police, and he promoted programs to encourage cit- izen cooperation with authorities to better stop illegal armed groups. Both initiatives were controversial, but they have produced results. When the original Plan Colombia expired in 2004, President Bush continued to provide U.S. assistance on a year-to-year basis totaling about $750 million annually, with some support given directly for military equipment, training and intelligence. It is only fair to note that the percentage of the total U.S. aid package has shifted more toward economic and social assistance, and the United States has successively improved the unilateral trade preferences that have helped stimulate Colombia’s non-traditional exports from flowers to manufacturing. But the central justification for U.S. assistance is still as it was in 1999: that constraining the narcotics trade will weaken Colombia’s illegal armed bands and strengthen the country in every respect. It is a logic Uribe accepts, perhaps even more than most Americans. Uribe’s government can claim some remarkable achievements. In the first year of his presidency, violence dropped sharply. Today kidnappings are a fraction of what they were in 2002. The murder rates in Bogota and Medellin are now lower than in Washington, D.C. Health, education and pension programs still mostly favor the middle class, but are reaching more of the poor. The economy has grown by more than 4 percent for three years. Backed by foreign assistance, the judicial system is reforming. The military is putting more pres- sure on all of the illegal armed groups. The major para- military groups are disbanding, a process unfolding under the loose supervision of the Organization of American States. The surrender of FARC and ELN soldiers seems to have shrunk both organizations by a third. It is no wonder that Uribe is highly favored to win re-election in May. Colombia has a strong tradi- tion, and until last year a constitu- tional prohibition, against allowing a sitting president to run for re- election. But with Uribe garnering approval ratings of 70 percent or better ever since his election, the Congress and the courts bowed to reality and let him run again. Still on the Brink Yet for all that success, Colombia remains a country on the brink of crisis. The FARC may have shed some members and lost some to capture by the government, but is still capable of taking on and defeating govern- ment forces in isolated skirmishes. Perhaps even more serious is the continuation of the underlying criminali- ty that has haunted the country for so many years. Many paramilitary soldiers may have turned in their arms, but the rural authoritarians who were at the heart of the phenomenon still hold sway in many parts of the country — and their urban counterparts are the alter- native government in many poor neighborhoods. They aspire, as Pablo Escobar did before them, to a political role, and that aspiration threatens Colombian democ- racy. A second Uribe administration (or that of his suc- cessor) will have to make much more progress on gov- ernment reform, including the always-difficult job of increasing the tax burden (now just 15 percent of GDP). The rule of law urgently needs to be further strengthened to give citizens faith in the justice system. While narcotics control efforts have been impressive in scope — 120,000 hectares eradicated each year, more than 200 tons of cocaine seized, more than 350 cartel leaders extradited to the United States — the impact of those efforts on the availability of drugs in the United States has been small, as has been the effect on the criminals themselves. And while President Bush and Secretary Rice rightly admire Colombia’s achieve- ments, the causes of violence — the flush demand for narcotics trade from abroad and the enduring tradition of impunity at home — have not yet been overcome. n F O C U S 38 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 6 While President Bush and Secretary Rice rightly admire Colombia’s achievements, the root causes of violence have not yet been overcome.