The Foreign Service Journal, April 2006

policy is likely to look south, align- ing the country with the interests of Latin America and the developing world. On his personal Web page, the candidate attributes Mexico’s turn to the north as motivated by “the illegitimacy of [former Presi- dent] Carlos Salinas’ government, which, when confronted by con- stant protests … led to a closer alignment with policies promoted by the U.S. government.” He has more of an ideological affinity with the thrust of the regimes in Argentina, Venezuela and Bolivia than either of his rivals for the presidency. So don’t be surprised to see a President Lopez Obrador pictured more often with Nestor Kirchner, Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales or even Fidel Castro than with his U.S. counterpart. (It is also worth noting that his English is not as fluent as that spoken by Mexico’s recent presi- dents.) This is not to say that he is another Chavez, seek- ing opportunities for confrontations with Washington, or that the cooperation manifested in the daily details of the bilateral relationship would cease. But it is likely that the tone of the relationship would change to one of greater distance, reflecting skepticism that U.S. and Mexican interests are complementary. For instance, Lopez Obrador has consistently expressed his dissatisfaction with some provisions of NAFTA, such as its agricultural clauses. Reopening nego- tiations in the present environment, when the American public and many of its elected representatives hold an increasingly unfavorable opinion of NAFTA due to job losses, would introduce another stressor into the bilateral relationship and further complicate U.S. efforts to imple- ment the FTAA. In the Middle: Roberto Madrazo Until Fox’s election, the Institutional Revolutionary Party had held power continuously for seven decades. So it was hardly surprising that affiliation with the PRI did not hurt the careers of professional Mexican diplo- mats. Should PRI candidate Roberto Madrazo be elect- ed, he will likely follow the tradition of rewarding promi- nent party figures with desirable ambassadorships, while supporting them by naming career officials sympathetic to the PRI to key positions. This will allow experienced diplomats to smooth over the inevitable rough edges in the bilat- eral relationship. Until former President Carlos Salinas tried to redefine “national sovereignty” in terms of economic development, the PRI deftly play- ed on public opposition to U.S. poli- cies to reinforce its dominant posi- tion. So don’t expect Madrazo to repeat Fox’s defense of the FTAA during the Summit of the Americas; instead, he would let the U.S. defend its own interests while he would work at strengthening Mexico’s ties with his counterparts in the hemisphere. Similarly, his foreign policy platform is a return to Mexico’s classic stance: “…our commitment to self-determination, non-intervention, peaceful solutions to controversies, and outlawing the threat or use of force in international relations.” To be sure, the Fox administration has voiced its dis- pleasure with certain U.S. actions, but under Madrazo, both the substance and the tone in which it would be conveyed would become much more strident. So issues like building a wall along the border and encroaching on Mexican territory without permission to repair it would become higher-profile irritants than they are now. Professional diplomats would be charged with repairing the damage wrought by more acrid public exchanges. Under Madrazo, NAFTA itself would not be an issue on the bilateral agenda. He is well aware that the bilater- al relationship has deepened as commercial relations between the two countries have strengthened, and Mexican administrations have come to believe that their country has much more to gain than to lose from closer integration and cooperation. But look for a Madrazo administration to exploit skillfully the historical emphasis on distance and opposition in the relationship even while developing more areas of cooperation. For instance, it is conceivable that he would use trade barriers to benefit constituencies he wanted to reward or needed to heed — rather like the U.S. interpretation of NAFTA’s trucking provisions. Still, whatever his rhetorical thrust, a President Madrazo would be very careful not to let words stand in the way of Mexico’s real interests, which reside in its rela- tionship with its northern neighbor. But whereas a Lopez Obrador-led government would give greater emphasis to F O C U S 44 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 6 Thanks to the success of NAFTA, trade disputes are no longer a defining issue on the bilateral agenda.