The Foreign Service Journal, April 2006

in the prestige and authority of the state, the weakening of an already debilitated rule of law, and increased regional and ethnic tension. Whether Morales can con- struct an effective government from the ruins of the old political system he helped dismantle remains to be seen. The public mood in Bolivia immediately following the election was one of generalized relief that violence and confrontation had been avoided by the size of Morales’ victory. His 54 percent of the popular vote translated into a substantial majority for the Movement Toward Socialism, or MAS, in Bolivia’s lower house of Congress (84 seats to 56 for his conservative opposition, with an additional 15 seats divided among two other centrist par- ties). But he has a minority position in the Senate, where he must rely on a political deal with two other parties in order to prevail. By any measure, however, Morales’ landslide victory in the Dec. 18 election gives him a pop- ular mandate. What Morales will do with that mandate is the key question for Bolivians and the international community alike. His populist and nationalistic campaign promises, oriented toward winning support from Bolivia’s impover- ished but politically-mobilized indigenous majority, awakened expectations that will be difficult to meet. Although Bolivia’s economy is in relatively good shape, it remains heavily dependent on the export of primary products — above all soya, natural gas and minerals — and on foreign aid. Any hope for sustained economic growth and job creation will depend on attracting domes- tic and foreign investment. Morales, however, may attempt to move the country back to the failed state-cap- italist model that prevailed before 1985. His choices to head the key economic development and hydrocarbon ministries certainly point in that direction. Morales’ campaign rhetoric was peppered with nega- tive references to the United States, portraying himself as a defender of Bolivian sovereignty and economic inter- ests in the face of “imperialism.” His first foreign travel on the heels of his victory took him to Cuba and then Venezuela, prompting the world media to portray him as firmly ensconced in the anti-American camp. Whether his program of government conforms to the verbiage of his campaign, or his views and positions take a more moderate turn, will be a key factor in determining his future relationship with the United States. That relationship will be important for both sides. The U.S. has long been the largest bilateral provider of foreign assistance to Bolivia and promotes high-profile support from international financial institutions, includ- ing coordinating (with Mexico) a Bolivia Support Group that raised nearly $100 million in additional funding to help the government of Carlos Mesa close its budget deficits in 2003 and 2004. U.S.-Bolivian bilateral ties have traditionally been close, although not without discordant episodes. The U.S. supported Bolivia’s return to democracy in 1982 and the economic liberalization process that began in 1985. Bolivia’s success in drastically reducing the amount of coca under cultivation in the lowlands Chapare region from some 46,000 hectares in 1997 to 15,000 in 2000 under “Plan Dignidad” was touted by the U.S. as a major achievement in the war on drugs in the Andean region. The emergence of Morales in Bolivian politics, repre- senting a disparate alliance of local political groups, civic organizations (many of a far-left orientation) and a core support group of coca growers in the Chapare region of Cochabamba Department, has long been a matter of concern to Bolivia-watchers in the U.S. government. His near-victory in the 2002 presidential elections and his subsequent maneuverings to force the winner — Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (popularly known as Goni) — and then Goni’s successor, Carlos Mesa, from power exacerbated that concern. Now, with his overwhelming victory, Morales-in-power is a reality, and the degree to which he will become, in his own words, a “nightmare” for the U.S. warrants close attention. Reform and Reaction In analyzing the path ahead for Morales, it is useful to look back at how and why he rose to power. It is also important to lay to rest the facile and self-serving expla- nation of his emergence as an expression of pent-up indigenous rage at being excluded from Bolivian political F O C U S A P R I L 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 55 Peter DeShazo is director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. A former FSO, Ambassador DeShazo served as deputy assistant secretary of State for Western Hemisphere affairs, deputy U.S. permanent representa- tive to the Organization of American States, and director of the Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs of the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs at the State Department. He was posted to La Paz, Medellin, Santiago, Panama City, Caracas and Tel Aviv.