The Foreign Service Journal, April 2006

the state. During this process, Morales established himself as a consummate power broker, able to call crowds into the streets and shut down much of Bolivia’s economy to move his agenda forward. The groups that drove Goni and Mesa from office and triggered the new round of elections held on Dec. 18 espoused a mix of strongly populist and nationalistic demands — ranging from broadened indigenous rights to the nationalization of hydrocarbons. Evo Morales and the radicals to his left both promoted and rode a tide of economic nationalism that sealed Goni’s fate in October 2003 and was eventually translat- ed into the Hydrocarbons Law passed by Congress in May 2005. The new law repealed Goni’s 1996 statute, placed Bolivia’s state hydrocarbons corporation (Yaci- mientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos, or YPF) in con- trol of the industry, imposed new taxes on production and ordered the renegotiation of all previous shared-risk contracts between (foreign) producers and the state. It marked a full-circle return of economic nationalism in Bolivia, similar to the circumstances under which Standard Oil and Gulf Oil were nationalized in 1937 and 1969, respectively. What Way Ahead? Bolivia now stands at a crossroads. The old political system based on coalitions of traditional parties has been swept away and the liberal economic reforms put in place in 1985 are likely to be dismantled. What will replace them? The MAS is a conglomerate of unions, civic groups and regional organizations — “a confederation of alliances” in the words of a former adviser to Morales — rather than a political party in the traditional sense. While Morales had a very strong showing in the heavily indigenous departments of La Paz, Oruru, Potosí, Cochabama and Chuquisaca, many of his supporters are of mestizo background and in the middle class, with a smattering of intellectuals and leftists of European descent. Reflecting its diverse and disunited base of support, the MAS proposed a vision rather than a program in its electoral campaign, protesting neoliberalism, imperial- ism and exclusion and promising profound change, but without laying out a coherent plan. Beyond a call for the nationalization of hydrocarbons and for holding a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution, the campaign rhetoric of the MAS vacillated between mod- erate populism, staunch nationalism and virulently leftist appeals. The legislative program Morales intends to carry out will have broad repercussions for Bolivia and for rela- tions with the United States. Among the most contentious issues will be: Democracy and governance. Is Morales a democrat? If so, what sort of democracy does he envision for Bolivia? Weak and ineffective governance lies at the heart of Bolivia’s underdevelopment and helped under- mine the potential of the economic reforms put in place during the 1990s. Among the most glaring weaknesses are broad disrespect for the rule of law, deep-seated offi- cial corruption, an ineffective civil service, low-quality policing, poor relations between the executive and leg- islative branches, enervated political parties, a wide- spread penchant for populism, and a political and civic culture that ignores the public good. Whether Morales attempts to deal with these fundamental problems will indicate the seriousness of his commitment to change. In compliance with his campaign promises, Morales has already called for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution for Bolivia. Reaching consensus on a new constitution would be a difficult enough task, given the broad ideological, ethnic and regional disparities that exist in the country. But if Morales intends to use the forum to promote a corporatist vision of society along the lines of the so-called “participatory democracy” of Chavez’s Venezuela, representative democracy would be at risk. Not averse to using force and the threat of it to advance his agenda when in the opposition, Morales must now wear the other shoe as president. A key factor in judging his democratic credentials will be the manner in which his government respects the human and civil rights of all Bolivians. Economic policy. Evo Morales’ economic views are a work in progress. From his campaign rhetoric and state- ments following his election, he clearly favors a strong role for the state in the economy and has a personal dis- trust of the private sector. Morales’ campaign promises F O C U S 58 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 6 Little more than a half-decade ago, Bolivia was Latin America’s poster child for political and economic reform.