The Foreign Service Journal, April 2006

Not long after his triumph, Morales visited the Chapare and assured planters that coca would return to the area, but without going into specifics such as how or how much. Increased production of coca in the Chapare would invariably provide additional raw material for cocaine and fuel narcotrafficking. Should Morales allow large-scale production to return to the region, he would be in violation of Bolivian law and would put himself at odds not only with the United States, but other countries where Bolivian cocaine is trafficked: Brazil, Argentina and Spain. The issue constitutes another testing ground for Morales. The U.S. Response Mindful of the spurt in support for Morales result- ing from a warning by the U.S. ambassador during the last days of the 2002 election that a vote for him would imperil U.S. aid, Embassy La Paz played its hand deftly and remained above the political fray in the 2005 elec- tion. Morales, for his part, met with Ambassador David Greenlee soon after the election and gave prominent media play to his meeting with Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Tom Shannon on the eve of his inauguration. His stridently anti-gringo rhetoric notwithstanding, Morales is familiar with U.S. positions on democracy, development and coca and may see the value of dialogue and accommodation with the U.S. The evolving relationship between Bolivia under Morales and the United States will depend to a large degree on his openness to cooperation and the skill of U.S. diplomats in encouraging the same. What happens in Bolivia in the ensuing months will have a bearing not only on the well-being of Bolivians but on regional stability. A turn toward authoritarian- ism, especially if paralleled by close ideological and diplomatic ties to Chavez and Castro, would imperil democracy and set a negative example for other politi- cal groups in the Americas claiming to represent indige- nous constituencies. The prickly nationalism that runs so deep in Bolivia may dissuade Morales and the MAS from attempting to turn the country into a client state of Venezuela or Cuba, if indeed they have any aspirations to do so. The appearance of Venezuelan or Cuban “advisers” in Bolivia, especially in the security services, would set off alarm bells. On the economic front, Morales will have a difficult time meeting demands for jobs, poverty reduction and sustained development if he attempts to turn back the clock by pursing state-capitalist formulas from the 1960s. If, on the other hand, he follows a more mod- erate economic strategy, he could thread the needle between growth and social investment, building on his strong political mandate and the willingness of the international community to give him the benefit of the doubt. The opposition to Morales was set back by the December vote, but is not invisible, especially in the Senate and in its regional bastions of support in the hydrocarbons-rich departments of Santa Cruz and Tarija. Soon after his election, Morales traveled to Santa Cruz to ensure local leaders that he would be the president of all Bolivians. Time will tell if he is. The U.S. should seek engagement with the new gov- ernment, fine-tuning its policies according to the deci- sions Morales takes and his willingness to work with the United States. One key variable pending final approval by Washington is Bolivia’s eligibility for nearly $600 million from the Millennium Challenge Account for infrastructure and development projects. Working with other countries, especially Brazil and Argentina, and the international community, the U.S. should encourage moderate political and economic policies fromMorales, even if he is by nature disinclined to take such steps. Washington should also give priority to public diplo- macy efforts to overcome the negative image of the U.S. in many circles, stressing American concern for democracy, economic development and poverty reduc- tion, as well as narcotics issues. Larger-scale invest- ment in alternative development projects in the Chapare and continued focus of USAID programs on El Alto, the altiplano and other bastions of MAS sup- port are needed. Embassy La Paz should make certain that it has Aymara- and Quechua-speaking Foreign Service National employees in key positions. The recent announcement by the State Department that two Foreign Service officers will be deployed to Santa Cruz is a good step, as well. Bolivia will be a difficult test for U.S. policy, with broad implications throughout the hemisphere. Evo Morales may turn out to be a force for positive change, or he may lead the country backward toward authori- tarianism and further misery. Whatever Washington can do to encourage the former outcome will benefit both nations. n F O C U S 60 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 6