The Foreign Service Journal, April 2007

T he State Department’s current contact reporting require- ments, as set forth in the Foreign Affairs Manual, confound American personnel; aid hostile intel- ligence services, which exploit ambi- guities in the CRR to entrap and pres- sure our diplomats; and undermine the department’s ability to safeguard classified and sensitive information. The pertinent sections of the FAM contain more enigmas and puzzles than The Da Vinci Code . A rule set that screams for clarity and precision is instead a study in “strategic ambigui- ty.” AFSA State Vice President Steve Kashkett has written in these pages ( AFSA News , November 2006) that “these archaic and ... contradictory regulations,” which have sometimes been enforced in “capricious and arbi- trary ways,” have tripped up “hun- dreds of loyal Foreign Service mem- bers,” resulting in “lasting damage to otherwise productive and distin- guished careers.” If the issue of the department’s CRR — which goes directly to the heart of State’s ability to protect its personnel from real harm and safeguard classified information — does not merit the immediate attention and action of management, it is difficult to imagine one that does. Below, I enumerate the most egre- gious problems and some possible solutions. There exist two self-standing and essentially distinct sets of CRR: those outlined in 3 FAM 4100, Appendix B, which govern intimate relationships and cohabitation; and those covered in 12 FAM 262, which govern contacts of counterintelli- gence concern. Each set of CRR has its own particular mission/purpose, reporting criteria, reporting channel and bureau of jurisdiction (Human Resources and Diplomatic Security, respectively). Having the CRR in two places in the FAM and under the aegis of two bureaus creates dangerous blind spots and jurisdictional confusion. (For example, in actuality, HR doesn’t enforce the 3 FAM CRR; DS does.) Moreover, because reporting under one section of the FAM does not con- stitute reporting under the other (per 12 FAM), the current CRR necessi- tate, in some cases, the filing of two reports for the same contact, one pur- suant to 3 FAM and one pursuant to 12 FAM. (Yet, oddly, both reports must use the same 12 FAM form, which is the only one that exists!) Solution: Unify all contact report- ing requirements under 12 FAM; place them under DS jurisdiction. The 3 FAM CRR are obscenely out of date; they address not today’s threats, but yesterday’s. The CRR codified in 3 FAM 4100, Appendix B, were published on June 20, 1988 — nearly two decades ago. They utterly fail to take into account the epic changes and events that have occurred in the world since then: the end of the Cold War, the emergence of new adversaries, the 9/11 attacks, the global war on terror and — not least — the rise of the Internet, which has greatly complicated traditional notions of “relationship” and “con- tact.” State seemed to recognize the gravity of this problem when, on April 15, 1995, it issued unclassified cable 95 State 93112, titled “Relation- ships and Contact Reporting.” The first line stated: “The FAM on subject policy has been revised and will short- ly be transmitted to all posts.” Though the changes to 12 FAM enumerated in this cable took effect immediately (as promised in the cable), the changes to 3 FAM never did, for reasons that are unclear to this day. Had they taken effect (as many FSOs thought they did), the changes would have: 1) replaced “communist- governed/allied” with “critical threat” as the affiliation of concern, thus end- ing the Cold War-era communist- focused non-fraternization policy; and 2) mandated the immediate reporting of only such relationships with nation- als of critical-threat countries that involved “bonds of affection, influence or obligation” (as opposed to “any rela- tionship” with communist nationals). Although these changes were rep- Time to Overhaul Contact Reporting Requirements B Y D AVID J. F IRESTEIN S PEAKING O UT 14 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 7 A rule set that screams for clarity and precision is instead a study in “strategic ambiguity.”