The Foreign Service Journal, April 2007

both in the North Caucasus and in the country as a whole. While Vladimir Putin benefited from popular reaction to Islamist terrorism in the run-up to his becom- ing president, the continuing spread of violence to areas outside the Caucasus may lead Russian voters to turn to more nationalist alternatives, thus threatening the cur- rent political elite’s hold on power. The potential for Islamist violence also threatens Russia’s continued economic growth, which in the long run will need to diversify away from the current focus on extracting energy resources. Diversification will require foreign investment to develop Russia’s manufacturing base — investment that may be scared away by the prospect of political instability and conflict. Muslims and Communists Traditional Islam in Russia is organized around Muslim “spiritual directorates,” which have existed in one form or another since the eighteenth century. Under Soviet rule, two directorates controlled Muslim affairs in Russia proper. The first, based in Dagestan, was respon- sible for the North Caucasus, while the second, based in Bashkortostan, covered the rest of Russia. During the early part of its history, the Soviet government sought to eliminate Islamic practice and belief throughout its terri- tory. Mosques were closed or destroyed, religious figures were killed or imprisoned, and the secret police infiltrat- ed the spiritual directorates. This is not to say that Islam was singled out for repression; much the same fate befell the Russian Orthodox Church and other religions. Beginning in the 1950s, official attitudes toward reli- gion in general and Islam in particular liberalized some- what. Islam was now tolerated and a few mosques were reopened. An implicit compact emerged, allowing Muslim believers to practice their religion as long as they did not question communist rule or attempt to impose Islamic beliefs on others in their community. Most of the Russian Federation, however, underwent a relatively rapid secularization as young people abandoned Islamic practices and beliefs in favor of the prevalent Soviet cul- ture. Secularization was dominant in urban areas, but by the 1980s had also made significant inroads into rural, traditionally Muslim communities in regions such as Tatarstan and Siberia. The relatively isolated and mountainous parts of the North Caucasus were the exception to this trend. Here, traditional Muslim practices combined with Soviet inno- vations such as collective farming in ways that often strengthened Islam rather than weakening it. The result was that even local Communist Party functionaries in Dagestan and Chechnya participated in collective prayer and tithed regularly. Spiritual leaders continued to exert considerable influence over local communities in the North Caucasus. The end of communism brought about a religious revival throughout the former Soviet Union, and Russian Islam benefited. There was a sizable growth both in the number of people professing to practice Islam and in public expressions of piety. Mosques quickly opened in virtually every Muslim village — not just in the North Caucasus but also in the Volga region and in parts of Siberia inhabited by Tatars, Kazakhs and Bashkirs. In cities that had previously been limited to one large mosque each, smaller mosques began to open in every neighborhood. Many of these mosques were financed by foreign money, much of which came from private foun- dations in Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states. Enter the Salafis Given a sudden increase in demand for clerics and a lack of Islamic educational facilities in the region, the Arab-run foundations also often sent clerics to run the new mosques. Many of these sought to eliminate local practices and innovations by preaching the puritanical Salafi Islam most commonly practiced in Saudi Arabia. (In the West, Salafi Islam is commonly referred to as Wahhabism. Developed on the Arabian Peninsula in the 18th century by Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, it is fundamentalist in the sense that it rejects all modifica- tions to Islamic practice after the time of the prophet. While some Salafis embrace violence as a means of restoring proper Islamic practice and fighting unbeliev- ers, most are not violent.) Salafi practices appeared excessively strict and there- fore radical to most Russian Muslims, but they gained popularity among young people who distrusted local Muslim leaders for their lack of Islamic education and their possible ties to Russian security services. The local leaders in turn felt threatened by the foreign clerics and, by highlighting the danger of the spread of Islamic radicalism, succeeded in having most of them expelled by the late 1990s. Nevertheless, Salafi Islam has continued to spread throughout Russia’s Muslim republics, and particularly in the North Caucasus. F O C U S 42 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 7