The Foreign Service Journal, April 2008

moderate, often religiously conservative leaders and insti- tutions in the region. This was not a public diplomacy effort in the sense of telling our story to the “target audi- ence,” but informal listening and dialogue, based on an acceptance, even appreciation, of the role that conserva- tive Muslim religious piety plays or can play in the societies of the region. These informal, unstructured and sometimes even un- planned exchanges of views generated significant, unantic- ipated good will, even in cases of previous hostility toward the U.S. In contrast to Samuel Huntington’s warnings of an impending “clash of civilizations,” such initiatives are in line with the “dialogue of civilizations” called for by figures as varied as Akbar Ahmed, Pakistan’s former high commis- sioner to Britain who now holds the Ibn KhaldumChair of Islamic Studies at American University, and Mohammed Khatami, the former president of Iran. Respectful dialogue with religiously conservative com- munities is not the norm in the foreign affairs, think-tank and intelligence communities because, in general, we aren’t inclined to acknowledge the value of conservative but peaceful expressions of faith as normal, admirable or enriching. Here in America, for example, can we under- stand and sympathize with positions of religiously conserv- ativeMuslims, Christians, Jews or other Americans regard- ing religious schooling, headcovering, abortion, sexuality, or belief in the truth of their scriptures even when we dis- agree with those positions? Are we upset about, rather than respectful of, family members or colleagues whose religious beliefs or practices set them apart? Without a sympathetic and engaged understanding of religiously con- servative faith at home, we are poorly equipped to engage with politically moderate Muslims in the larger world. Such an engagement is crucial for truly understanding situations where conservative faith can turn into — or be manipulated by our enemies into — support for terrorist activity. Without understanding what draws people to faith, we can’t understand, for example, why a young Muslim in Uzbekistan would want to join a radical organi- zation like Hizb-u-Tahrir (HT — the “Party of Libera- tion”). HT is a secretive group that claims a peaceful ap- proach but appears to have a radical political agenda. With few outlets for legitimate economic or spiritual aspirations, a young man might be drawn to HT not for its political agenda, but rather for being one of the very few spiritual and ostensibly incorruptible groups in that society who are trying to live purely and seek God’s truth. Yet much cur- rent analysis sees HT only as a manipulative group with a radical, possibly terrorist political agenda. This analysis misunderstands or ignores the aspirations for spiritual growth and purity that motivate young people in a repres- sive, corrupt society that is hostile to Muslim piety. Misunderstanding or dismissing pious expressions of conservative religious faith leads to other flawed analyses and policy prescriptions heard far too often in embassy team meetings and Washington briefings. These analyses assume that religion — particularly Islam — is the prob- lem; if only we could minimize its influence, we could win the war of ideas. I highlight the pernicious implications of this approach below: Muslim NGOs. There is some concern within the security community about the growth of Muslim non- governmental organizations, based on the expectation that some groups may become sources of terrorist finance. But this concern overlooks the role of civil society — including religious NGOs and other organizations — as inherently moderating and stabilizing, even if a few individual NGOs do have a volatile agenda. Indeed, one of the greatest suc- cesses of U.S. foreign aid in the post-communist world has been in opening up space for an expanding and deepening civil society. Our security concern should be directed to states that limit the activities of NGOs as a way to clamp down on civil society. By limiting the peaceful expression of people’s ideas, complaints and aspirations (religious and secular alike), such governments drive citizens toward violent ways to express themselves. In Uzbekistan, for example, some of the recruitment of young people into HT is precisely the result of having no other way to voice their concerns and aspirations. Conversely, USAID’s long engagement with Muslim organizations in Indonesia has certainly helped some of them play a stabilizing and moderating role there. The financing of terrorist groups and the existence of radical NGOs that espouse violence are real concerns, of course. But the answer is not to wish away civil society and its essential stabilizing role. Instead, we should spend sig- nificantly more attention and resources to help NGOs, including Muslim-affiliated ones, expand in ways that pro- mote transparency in finance and clarity of vision and pur- pose. The Turkish Model. Another suggestion often heard is that we should encourage or acquiesce in the adoption of the Turkish model of managing Islam in countries with significant Muslim populations, a model shared by Russia, F O C U S 24 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 8