The Foreign Service Journal, April 2008

lem-solving, despite their current sus- picion of American motives and con- cerns about U.S. foreign policy. When we help Muslim leaders and institu- tions in a respectful, effective way to solve their communities’ organization- al, teaching, health or other problems, they appreciate such support in the same way that non-Muslims around the world do. Finally, despite current trends toward State-USAID integration, there are advantages to maintaining some separation between the two entities. Carried out at several removes from the chancery, these programs are managed by USAID, but often implement- ed by local NGOs, while the face-to-face contact is with private Americans or with local staff. One challenge to expanding or sustaining these activi- ties is that, unlike areas such as agriculture, economic pol- icy or HIV/AIDS, they are not seen within USAID or the Foreign Service as a professional specialty. Usually, when a major new set of issues arises, the agency engages in a range of pilot activities over a period of two to three years, evaluates them, catalogs best practices, creates a personnel cadre to carry those best practices to USAID missions overseas, identifies a bureaucratic home in a Washington bureau, and develops a sense of unified mission and com- mon practice within that group of personnel. But despite some early, informal efforts, this has yet to occur with Muslim engagement activities. There are other challenges to such work, of course, including funding, confusion about how and where it is legal for the U.S. government to work with religious insti- tutions, and the inflexibility of the new “Foreign Assistance Framework” into which all aid projects must fit. A major challenge, discussed below, is managing the risks involved in working with various Muslim organizations. Taking Manageable Risks Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld issued a challenge in his October 2003 “long, hard slog” memo: to prevent recruitment of new generations of Muslim terror- ists faster than the U.S. can kill or capture the current ones. Nearly five years later, Washington still has not responded to this challenge coherently and effectively. Instead, separate policy areas managed in isolation pre- clude a strategic approach. Counter terrorism, public diplomacy, and the promotion of democracy and Muslim engagement each have separate intera- gency decision processes. When these activities intersect or bump up against each other, there is no coherent process for making judgments and weighing risks to ensure optimum outcomes. Yet policies could be adjusted — without increasing the risk of terrorist attack — in ways that expand U.S. engagement and strengthen politically moderate Muslims and Islamic organizations. Such adjustments will be difficult and com- plex, requiring an effective dialogue with Congress, but they must be made to better position the U.S. to win the war of ideas that undergirds the war on terror. Here it is important to explicitly state my argument: It is in the United States’ interest to engage a diverse range of politically moderate Muslim individuals and organiza- tions, including some who are theologically conservative, and strengthen them in their commitment to democratic values and political moderation and thereby in their role in the war of ideas raging within the Islamic faith. Not every- one agrees. There are some in the U.S. security and coun- terterrorism communities who believe that engaging or strengthening Muslim NGOs or leaders conflicts with the goal of preventing another 9/11. Others assert that it is necessary to stop all NGO contributions or activities in sen- sitive areas (e.g., the West Bank and Gaza) because that is the only way to cut off terrorist finance. These are serious, not frivolous, concerns; and it is important to respond to them with facts and clarity, recog- nizing that current security measures have paid priceless dividends in preventing terrorist incidents on U.S. soil for six years. However, the fact remains: engagement with politically moderate Muslims does not increase the risk of terrorist attack. For one thing, the kind of relationships that USAID and its grantees and contractors have with Muslim NGOs (as is the case with other local groups) can- not be used in pursuit of a terrorist agenda. USAID sup- port consists almost entirely of training in management, leadership or certain technical fields (for example, health, education and micro-lending) or of small grants for specif- ic activities. In addition, the USAID inspector general and the agency’s audit programs are among the most competent in the U.S. government (for good reason, given the financial- F O C U S 26 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 8 Engagement with politically moderate Muslims does not increase the risk of terrorist attack.