The Foreign Service Journal, April 2008

is an example of the kind of failure that probably happens frequently without making the headlines. It is vital to focus on the benefits of engagement with politically moderate Muslims; otherwise, our current counterterrorism lens will screen out many opportunities. Toward a Sensible Policy If expanding dialogue to help anchor and deepen political moderation among a wider range of Muslim groups is a legitimate policy goal, then at least two sets of actions should be the subject of an interagency process. Due to its sensitivity, this process must involve Congress. The first set of actions involves the federal guidelines for NGOs working overseas. The second involves the use of U.S. counterterrorism databases. Such an interagency policy process would likely identify other actions beyond these two, discussed below. Treasury and USAID’s guidelines and reporting requirements for NGOs merit rethinking. Currently the U.S. Treasury voluntary guidelines, the USAID partner- vetting system and similar reporting requirements are focused solely on minimizing the risk that any NGO engaged overseas could be linked, even distantly, with a group or individual involved in terrorism or terrorist finance. Yet as with any system, trying to reduce risks to as close to zero as possible has significant downsides. The costs of these guidelines — in money, time, paperwork and (perhaps most important) fear of reporting personal information that may be shared with U.S. and foreign intelligence services — are borne by the NGOs, their members, participants and officers. And they ensure a reduction in the numbers of politically moderate groups willing to partner and engage with the United States. Attention also must be paid to improving the National Counterterrorism Center database, which relies on multi- ple sources of varying quality and reliability. Every false positive has the potential to prevent various U.S. organs from engaging with influential, politically moderate Muslim individuals and NGOs and expanding their influ- ence. Given the premium quite rightly put on avoiding an attack on U.S. soil, it is likely that many of the systems feeding data into the NCTC are biased toward false posi- tives. The challenge for the interagency community is not to reduce those but to decide how to manage the fact that we have a system that indeed needs to be biased toward false positives. What would a more sensible risk management strategy look like? Re- porting requirements could be re- designed in cooperation with NGO representatives in ways to encourage more, instead of less, engagement with Muslim NGOs. These guide- lines could, for example, stipulate differing levels of scrutiny for different-size grants or different kinds of activities. At the NCTC, it might involve creating a position for a “Muslim engagement ombudsman,” whose job would be to weigh risks and benefits of part- nering with people or institutions when a federal agency vets a name with the database. This official, who would work in a classified and nec- essarily nontransparent environment, would be the “go to” person if a proposed partner’s name came up. In such a situation, the ombudsman would make an informed strategic judgment about whether or not the activity should go ahead, after taking into account the quality of the NCTC information and the expected ben- efits to the U.S. of the proposed activity or partnership. The post or USAID mission — given the nature of NCTC information — would usually not see the ratio- nale for the decision, but would know that an informed judgment, taking account all the factors, had been made. Currently, there is no interagency dialogue to consider such solutions. In summary, USAID has laid the groundwork for engaging and strengthening politically moderate Muslims — some of whom may be theologically conser- vative — within a wide range of dialogue and programs. We should build on this experience. But taking it to a level where it would have significantly broader impact will require several changes: increasing our understand- ing and appreciation of religious and spiritual aspirations among politically moderate Muslims; institutionalizing Muslim engagement work as a recognized career- enhancer; and rethinking risk management approaches in national counterterrorism strategy to encourage work with the broadest range of politically moderate Muslim groups. This latter change requires creating a new strate- gic interagency process, as well as initiating dialogue with Congress about risk management and expanded engage- ment with Muslim NGOs. F O C U S 28 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 8 It is vital to focus on the benefits of engagement with politically moderate Muslims.