The Foreign Service Journal, April 2008

But while the generals remain a potent factor in political calculations in Turkey to this day, they are con- strained in exercising power by their recognition that ruling by fiat would generate strong domestic resistance. A military coup would also powerfully disrupt the country’s course toward membership in the European Union, a relationship that they strongly desire. Hence, instead of taking action on their own, these days they merely invite the civilian politicians by indirection (proclaiming that their views are so well known that they do not have to be repeated) to oppose what the military leaders consider violations of secularism. While the senior generals seem united in their view of Islam, the civilian camp is not. Cosmopolitan Euro- pean influences dominate in the major cities and in the developed coastal part of Turkey that has long been a favorite tourist destination, with its beaches where top- less bathers do not heed Islamic strictures on public display. Yet in the poorer sections of the large cities, migrants from the villages observe traditional dress and customs, with the mosque playing an increasing role. And even in Ankara, Ataturk’s stricture against building new religious edifices has fallen away; Friday prayers in scores of new mosques are attended by many tens of thousands. Central Turkey, including such cities as Konya, Kayseri and Gaziantep, is home to the “Anatolian tigers,” emerg- ing economic powerhouses based on clothing manufac- ture, construction and other industries. Their owners are associated with the modernizing movement led by Islamic scholar Fethullah Gulen, who seeks to adapt Moham- mad’s teachings to the current day and stresses contem- porary education and the harmony of the three Abrahamic religions. This well-funded, moderate reli- gious current, with its many high schools, forms the back- bone of support for the ruling Justice and Development Party (generally known by its Turkish initials, AK). Finally, the eastern region of Anatolia is populated both by highly conservative Sunni Kurds and secular- minded Alevi Turks and Kurds. The latter groups tend to shun mosques and, quite unlike the Shiite Iranians next door, back secular parties — particularly those who claim descent from Ataturk’s own political organization. Religion has been part of the bat- tleground of politics in Turkey for decades. But recently the struggle over religious issues has taken a new form, especially after the victory of the brand-new AK Party in the 2002 par- liamentary elections. This party is led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a former popular mayor of Istanbul who had been jailed in 1998 for referring to minarets as “bayonets of the faithful.” Among other things, the party appeared to stand for greater scope for the practice of Islam. Because of the vagaries of the Turkish election system, the AK Party took just over 60 percent of the seats in Parliament, even though it only received about a third of the total vote in 2002. That result came about because nearly half the ballots cast nationwide were discarded, having been marked for the 16 secular parties that did not exceed the required 10 percent of the national vote needed by any individual party to elect deputies. Thus, the AK’s victory was not a majority movement in favor of a religiously oriented party. Moreover, polling shows that much of its support reflected disappointment with decades of rule by secular parties, which were seen as guilty of corruption and unable to provide effective government. The new party seemed especially attractive because Erdogan, as mayor of Istanbul, had run the largest city in Turkey efficiently and honestly. Slow but Steady Wins the Race? The party’s leaders clearly understand that much of their support comes from devotees of good government, so until recently they have moved quite slowly along a reli- gious course. In fact, on the eve of the 2007 elections they purged a third of their deputies for appearing too conser- vative. Such tactics, and Turkey’s unusually strong eco- nomic performance under its stewardship, appeared responsible for increasing the AK Party’s share of the national vote from 34 percent to 47 percent. Recent polling data provide additional insights into why the party has moved only slowly to change secular laws. When asked their opinion of Shariah (Islamic reli- gious law), some 21 percent of Turks say they favor its adoption in place of the present secular codes. But when pollsters went on to ask whether a man should be per- F O C U S 30 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 8 Among other things, the AK Party appears to stand for greater scope for the practice of Islam.