The Foreign Service Journal, April 2009

A P R I L 2 0 0 9 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 19 Sarkozy, who has already shown greater willingness to participate in NATO military operations, has also taken sometimes-unpopular (with French military and regional offi- cials) decisions to rationalize Fran- ce’s sprawling defense establish- ment. It may be that by having France “take its full place again in NATO,” Sarkozy has made a calculation that collective security is a cost-effective way of dealing with constrained national defense budgets. Yet the relative lack of preparation of French public opinion for the rein- tegration into NATO’s military command highlights Sarkozy’s downplaying its importance domestically, where there is a tradition of anti-militarism in the Socialist Party opposition and proud independence among ruling UMP conservatives. Much depends on spin, and Sarkozy’s (self)- satisfaction with the modest progress on E.U. defense dur- ing his 2008 presidency provides sufficient cover to present French rapprochement within NATO as a prudent measure whose time has come. NATO Expansion and Power Projection Though Americans might scoff at French recalcitrance over the years, there has long been a real- ization in foreign policy and defense circles that France’s absence fromNATO commands was a net loss for the Al- liance, and not just from an institutional perspective. France, with its worldwide territories and overseas “de- partments,” has a navy that literally patrols the seven seas. Its army, though considerably downsized after the end of conscription in 2001, remains a force capable of power projection, whether independently or as part of E.U., NATO or United Nations operations. F O C U S Despite cracks about “freedom fries,” France’s absence from NATO commands has been a net loss for the alliance.