The Foreign Service Journal, April 2009

A P R I L 2 0 0 9 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 21 tions, the “Eurozone” includes the subset of member-states that have adopted the euro. The E.U.’s fledg- ling defense efforts are in similar need of “pioneer groups,” as they are called — led by countries with comparative advantage in key de- fense areas. Just like the single cur- rency and the “Schengen” mechan- ism governing external and internal borders, the E.U. may find its way to building on such initiatives by core member-states in the defense arena as EUROCORPS, and by the Union as a whole through the European Defense Agency. Similarly, NATO’s member-states have long claimed the right to opt in or opt out of myriad specialized agen- cies. This NATO version of variable geometry has meant that subgroups of countries can take the lead in areas of particular interest to their circumstances, whether in strategic fuel pipeline manage- ment, munitions development or others. NATO prevents none of this from happening in the E.U., and indeed has everything to gain from coordinated, parallel efforts to streamline and rationalize military establishments. Nor does NATO’s continued existence prevent en- hanced U.S.-E.U. cooperation on the wide range of issues that fall outside the defense realm. The Atlantic Alliance, cumbersome as some might find its requirement for consensus, affords Europeans and North Americans a unique tool for building on 60 years of common defense. In Brussels, the U.S. already has its seat at the figurative head of the table. If NATO— an al- liance of free-market democracies —did not already exist, wouldn’t some trans-Atlantic visionaries try to invent it? F O C U S If NATO — an alliance of free-market democracies — did not already exist, wouldn’t some trans-Atlantic visionaries try to invent it?