The Foreign Service Journal, April 2009

A P R I L 2 0 0 9 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 23 clear doctrine that carried major im- plications for the allies, and the with- drawal of France from NATO’s military structure. The 1970s brought Germany’s Ostpolitik, an American internal loss of confidence after Vietnam, and the first decisions on the de- ployment of short- and medium- range nuclear missiles that rocked Europe. The 1980s saw President Ronald Reagan’s “evil empire” speech and his declara- tion of intent to eliminate nuclear weapons — both dis- concerting for the Allies, who found them surprising and unnerving. And 1989 brought the fall of the Berlin Wall. What many considered NATO’s raison d’etre, and certainly the proximate cause of its existence, ended soon afterward with the fall of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself. Yet NATO survived and responded to crises in Bosnia and Kosovo, even as it continued to agonize over its continued relevance during the 1990s. The beginning of the 21st century witnessed the 9/11 attacks and, in response, NATO’s first invocation of the Article 5 mutual defense clause. Sidelined in Afghani- stan at the outset of that war, the Alliance is now trying to see a way forward there in difficult and, some would say, deteriorating circumstances. In this climate, it is worth recalling a passage from the 1967 Harmel Report, drafted mainly by representa- tives of some of NATO’s smaller members and under- taken in response to an existential crisis. That report concluded: “The Alliance is a dynamic and vigorous or- ganization which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions. It has also shown that its future tasks can be handled within the terms of the treaty by building on the methods and procedures which have proved their value over many years. Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, the international situation has chang- ed significantly and the political tasks of the Alliance have assumed a new dimension. … Although the dispar- ity between the power of the United States and that of Europe remains, Europe has recovered and is on its way toward unity.” Four decades later, that assess- ment could be put almost verbatim into a communiqué for this year’s anniversary summit in France and Ger- many. Despite persistent doubts about the organiza- tion’s viability, NATO’s successes are truly historic. Institutionally, it established and maintained reasonably robust procedures and standards for military planning and operations, despite barriers ranging from language differences to recent and longstanding animosities among its members. It also developed effective, if some- times inefficient, means of political coordination on se- curity matters. As for specific challenges, NATO can point to the suc- cessful defense and extension of freedom in Europe throughout and after the Cold War; the management of the security aspects of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s; and the enlargement of the Alliance in ways that preserved NATO’s functions while encouraging reform in new members. That said, NATO does face some real difficulties that differ qualitatively, and perhaps decisively, from its ear- lier anxieties. The Challenges of Afghanistan It is common to hear that NATO “cannot fail in Afghanistan,” because to do so would spell the end of the Alliance. If true, the allies have set for themselves daunting strategic and tactical goals on which to stake their collective future. Military victory in Afghanistan has proven an impossible task for foreign powers rang- ing from the British Empire to the Soviet Union. Both London and Moscow were willing to use harsh measures in pursuit of objectives less ambitious than what NATO is striving to achieve: safeguarding some form of repre- sentative government that rules centrally from Kabul. Yet both powers were eventually driven out of Afghani- stan, and were weakened by their failures there. F O C U S NATO has survived and responded to past crises, even as it continued to agonize over its continued relevance. Joseph R. Wood, a Senior Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund inWashington, D.C., specializes in Europe, Eurasia and trans-Atlantic relations. From 2005 to 2008, he was deputy assistant to Vice President Richard Cheney for national security affairs, with responsibility for White House policy involving Europe, Eurasia and Africa. A graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado, the French Joint Defense College in Paris and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Mr. Wood is a retired Air Force colonel.